


# Strategy Research Project International Fellow

## "Citizen in Uniform:" Democratic Germany and the Changing *Bundeswehr*

by

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United States Army War College  
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*BUNDESWEHR***

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## ABSTRACT

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This Strategic Research Project (SRP) describes how *Innere Fuehrung*, with its corollary of "citizen in uniform," assured that the norms and values of the German Basic Law were embedded in the *Bundeswehr*. It elaborates on this principle and shows how *Innere Fuehrung* shaped the civil-military relationship in Germany. It then explains how the principle has successfully adapted to three paradigm changes of the *Bundeswehr*: (a) rearmament that included integration of former *Wehrmacht* and *Reichswehr* soldiers, (b) integration of former East German soldiers after reunification, (c) performance of new worldwide missions. It then examines a recent fourth paradigm change: Germany's transition to an all-volunteer force. The SRP concludes with some recommendations to ensure that *Innere Fuehrung*, with its corollary of "citizen in uniform," will remain the guiding principle for the new all-volunteer *Bundeswehr*.





## "CITIZEN IN UNIFORM:" DEMOCRATIC GERMANY AND THE CHANGING *BUNDESWEHR*

The *Innere Fuehrung* with its corollary of "citizen in uniform" greatly contributed to the fact that the *Bundeswehr*<sup>1</sup> became not only a self evident part of our society but also a reliable instrument of German security policies.

—Dr. Franz Josef Jung  
Former German Defense Minister<sup>2</sup>

On 12 May 1949 Germany's three Western Military Governors (United States, France and Great Britain) sent a letter to Dr. Conrad Adenauer, the President of the Parliamentary Council. With some reservations, this letter approved the Draft Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany.<sup>3</sup> In less than two weeks, on 23 May 1949, the Constitution (or Basic Law)<sup>4</sup> for the young democracy was confirmed by the Parliamentary Council in a public session.<sup>5</sup> The unique preamble of the Basic Law committed the German nation to the promotion of peace and European unity. However, the Basic Law did not include any articles about the establishment of armed forces.<sup>6</sup> Germany and its occupying powers were determined not to repeat the militarism and fanaticism that had brought Germany and the world into two devastating wars in the first half of the century.

The deepening East-West conflict necessitated a German military contribution to defend the freedom of the West. This was especially evident after the 1950 communist invasion of South Korea.<sup>7</sup> The United States urged its European NATO Partners to rearm Germany as a NATO member after the Plevan Plan for a European Defense Community was rejected by the French national assembly in 1954.<sup>8</sup> But German citizens who had suffered two major wars remained skeptical regarding their country's rearmament.<sup>9</sup> Chancellor Adenauer managed to gain formal approval of rearmament,

even though the majority of Germans opposed it.<sup>10</sup> He saw this as a way to restore Germany's sovereignty and for Germany to gain equal partnership within the western alliance of democracies.<sup>11</sup> On 12 November 1955, the 200<sup>th</sup> birthday of General Scharnhorst, "the founding father of conscription in Prussia,"<sup>12</sup> the first 101 volunteers joined the *Bundeswehr*.<sup>13</sup> Two years later the first 10,000 conscripts were drafted.<sup>14</sup>

A central issue was how to best guarantee that the new forces would be an integral part of the young democracy and not yield to anti-democratic tendencies in its ranks. This was especially important because much of its military leadership would come from the veterans of the *Wehrmacht* and *Reichswehr*. In October 1950, a rearmament commission established by Chancellor Adenauer issued its initial proposal for the formation of a new German army. A group of 15 hand-picked former *Wehrmacht* officers met at the "*Eifelkloster Himmerod*" under the lead of Adolf Heusinger<sup>15</sup> and drafted the so-called "*Himmeroder Denkschrift*" (Himmerod Memorandum),<sup>16</sup> which became the founding document for the new *Bundeswehr*. The group strongly advised that the preconditions for German rearmament should be totally different from those that led to the *Wehrmacht*. They insisted that Germany's new army should be closely integrated with German society and subordinate to civilian leadership.<sup>17</sup> German leaders did not want to create another "state within a state,"<sup>18</sup> as happened with the *Reichswehr*. Nor did they want the military to be misused politically or to be subject to political indoctrinations, as was the *Wehrmacht*.<sup>19</sup>

The preamble of the Basic Law guided the new German national vision: "Inspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe, the German people, in the exercise of their constituent power, have adopted this Basic

Law.”<sup>20</sup> The founding fathers of the *Bundeswehr* had to ensure that the norms and values embodied in the Basic Law would be assured in the *Bundeswehr*.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, General Graf von Baudissin<sup>22</sup> advocated that the *Bundeswehr* be built on the principle of *Innere Fuehrung* (leadership development and civic education), based on its corollary of “citizen in uniform” (*Staatsbuerger in Uniform*).<sup>23</sup> Civil-military relations were arranged in accordance with the Basic Law and in keeping with the principle of *Innere Fuehrung*. To ensure that the *Bundeswehr* conformed to the Basic Law, three pillars were established at its founding: the principle of *Innere Fuehrung*, the corollary of “citizen in uniform”, and conscription of German citizens for military service.

This SRP describes how *Innere Fuehrung*, with its corollary of “citizen in uniform,” assured that the norms and values of the German Basic Law were embedded in the *Bundeswehr*. It elaborates on this principle and shows how *Innere Fuehrung* shaped the civil-military relationship in Germany. It then explains how the principle has remained intact through three paradigm changes of the *Bundeswehr*: (a) rearmament that included integration of former *Wehrmacht* and *Reichswehr* soldiers, (b) integration of former East German soldiers after reunification, (c) performance of new worldwide missions. It then considers the implications of a recent fourth paradigm change: Germany’s transition to an all-volunteer force. This SRP concludes with some recommendations to ensure that *Innere Fuehrung*, with its corollary of “citizen in uniform,” will remain the guiding principle for the new all-volunteer *Bundeswehr*.<sup>24</sup>

#### *Innere Fuehrung* (1<sup>st</sup> Pillar – Overarching Principle)

A simple definition or translation of *Innere Fuehrung* does not exist.<sup>25</sup> Even the recent version of the *ZDv 10/1* (Joint Service Regulation—Leadership Development and Civic Education)<sup>26</sup> offers more of an explanation than a definition of the concept.<sup>27</sup>

Maj. Petra McGregor, USAF, provides the following description: “*Innere Fuehrung* is...understood as a leadership philosophy that ties professional ethics to the values of democracy and thus [re]presents the corporate culture of the German armed forces.”<sup>28</sup> On the *Bundeswehr* website of the Ministry of Defense, the concept is described as: “harmoniz[ing] the principles of a free and democratic constitutional state with the principles of order and operation required by the armed forces to fulfill their constitutional mission. Today [2011] *Innere Fuehrung* is more than ever a distinct hallmark of the German armed forces.”<sup>29</sup>

Leadership and civic education are two parts of *Innere Fuehrung*: In German “*Fuehrung*” means both.<sup>30</sup> Leadership and civic education within the *Bundeswehr* are essential to avoid the unquestioning and slavish<sup>31</sup> obedience that characterized *Nazi-Wehrmacht* soldiers. *Innere Fuehrung* fosters moral courage and encourages soldiers stand up for their own beliefs. The soldiers’ “law on obedience” ensures that the values and norms of the Basic Law are binding guidelines for soldiers in any situation.<sup>32</sup> As a mandatory part of leadership, civic education emphasizes *Bundeswehr* leaders’ duty to provide political education for the soldiers to “intensify their knowledge of the values and norms of the Basic Law.”<sup>33</sup> This education also includes other elements of civil-military relations, such as the role of both civilian and military leadership and the relation between law and military discipline.<sup>34</sup>

#### “Citizen in Uniform” (2<sup>nd</sup> Pillar – 1<sup>st</sup> Vital Corollary to *Innere Fuehrung*)

The guiding corollary of “citizen in uniform” is the critical element of the concept of *Innere Fuehrung*; it guarantees the army’s link to the state and society. In general, it guarantees soldiers the same rights as all other citizens while serving in the *Bundeswehr*. Some basic rights are explicitly confirmed by the Legal Status of Military

Personnel Act (*Soldatengesetz* or SG).<sup>35</sup> However, a few citizen-soldiers' rights are restricted to avoid conflicts in loyalties between the military and the state and to balance personal freedom with obligations to the state.<sup>36</sup> The principle of *Innere Fuehrung* balances the need for an efficient, mission-ready military against the need to uphold society's democratic values.

#### Conscription (3<sup>rd</sup> Pillar – 2<sup>nd</sup> Vital Corollary to *Innere Fuehrung*)

The founding fathers of the *Bundeswehr* and the Parliament chose a conscript army based on lessons learned from the past. Conscription was seen “as an organizational device to counteract anti-democratic political ambitions of the officer corps of the armed forces.”<sup>37</sup> In addition, every citizen has an obligation to serve his country and thereby gain an understanding of the role of the military in society and strengthen the civil-military relation. Conscription ensures that the military reflects all elements of society. As President Heuss asserted, conscription slowly became the “legitimate child of democracy”<sup>38</sup> in “West German political culture.”<sup>39</sup>

Resting on these three pillars,<sup>40</sup> *Innere Fuehrung* dynamically integrates the unchangeable core values espoused in the Basic Law into the *Bundeswehr*. It affirms the civil-military relation in Germany and it defines the self-image of the *Bundeswehr*. Through the corollary of “citizen in uniform,” the *Bundeswehr* has become an integral part of the German state and society. It has enabled the nations' military to adapt to major changes in society, in the state, and in the world around it.

#### Paradigm Change 1: Re-armament and Integration of Former *Wehrmacht* and *Reichswehr* Soldiers

The *Reichswehr* provided the armed forces for the first democratic German state, the Weimar Republic (1919-1933). Its soldiers reflected the pre-democratic attitudes

prevalent in the Wilhelmine era. However, because its officer corps could not accept parliamentary democracy, the *Reichswehr* essentially evolved into “a state within a state” that eventually undermined the Republic.<sup>41</sup> Its successor, the *Wehrmacht*, developed characteristics of extreme German militarism committed to furthering the ideals of National Socialism. Thus it became a willing means to achieve the perverted ends of the Third Reich (1933–1945).<sup>42</sup> Consequently, the founders of the new *Bundeswehr* assiduously sought to avoid any repetition of the catastrophic consequences of these former military forces.

The Himmerod Memorandum (9 October 1950) conveyed the initial views on how the new German armed forces should be designed. The memo quickly asserted that these forces had to be fundamentally different from the former German armed forces. Accordingly, in a chapter entitled “*Das Innere Gefuege*” (inner structure),<sup>43</sup> it recommended a fundamentally new approach for new German armed forces:<sup>44</sup> “*Inneres Gefuege*” was further developed into the principle of *Innere Fuehrung* and its corollary of “citizen in uniform.”<sup>45</sup> At this time, public discussions of rearmament tended to be bitter and controversial. Following the Allied programs of denazification, demilitarization, and democratization, Germans were not ready to rearm.<sup>46</sup> So *Innere Fuehrung* was designed to gain public trust: The new armed forces would be created completely in accord with the Constitution; the new military establishment would be an integral part of society.

To guarantee very strong civil control,<sup>47</sup> command and control of the military would be exercised by a civil-military Ministry of Defense under robust political leadership. The principle “divide et impera” (divide and rule) within the *Bundeswehr* was

established. According to the Basic Law, a separate administrative substructure was established beneath the military structure.<sup>48</sup> The term “civil control,” adopted from US constitutional theory, was intentionally mistranslated to allow the civil authorities to directly control all military activities and to assure the constitutional superiority of political over military leaders.<sup>49</sup>

General Ulrich de Maizière,<sup>50</sup> one of the founding members of the Bundeswehr, further articulated four components of “*Das Innere Gefuege*.”<sup>51</sup> First, the armed forces would be integrated into an alliance that provided for a common defense of Europe. This accorded with the intent of the preamble and Article 24 of the German Basic Law.<sup>52</sup> Second, Germany’s armed forces would have only a defensive mission, in accord with Article 87a of the Basic Law.<sup>53</sup> So any kind of offensive action was strictly forbidden.<sup>54</sup> Third, Germany’s armed forces would be organized jointly to reduce the independence of the separate military services. They would be led by a single defense department that controlled personnel, budget, and defense acquisition.<sup>55</sup> Fourth, the forces would observe the Basic Law and submit to the primacy of civilian authority. Thus the military would be controlled by the Parliament in all matters. (Accordingly the German military is often described as a “parliamentary armed force”).<sup>56</sup> In addition, a close assistant to Baudissin even demanded “democracy within the army.”<sup>57</sup>

Given Germany’s history, civilian control of the military had to be very strong and efficient. At the beginning, this requirement caused much discussion and frustration within the *Bundeswehr*.<sup>58</sup> Its leaders were especially reluctant to yield direct civilian control of *Bundeswehr* soldiers.<sup>59</sup> But this political control was designed to ensure the linkage between the *Bundeswehr* and the German state and society. It would also foster

a democratic mindset in the troops. *Innere Fuehrung* with its corollary of “citizen in uniform” thus provided the means to gain public trust in and support of the nation’s armed forces.

Command over the *Bundeswehr* in peacetime was given to a civilian Minister of Defense, supported by state secretaries (parliamentary and public officials). Only in times of conflict (during actual or impending attacks)<sup>60</sup> were the powers of command transferred to the Federal Chancellor.<sup>61</sup> The military thus had no central command and control of its own. Its *Generalinspekteur (GenInsp)*, a kind Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), did not outrank the civilian chiefs.<sup>62</sup> In addition, as spelled out in the Basic Law, a Defense Committee (*Verteidigungsausschuss*)<sup>63</sup> was established to represent the members of the Parliament and to ensure parliamentary control over the executive and thus the armed forces.<sup>64</sup> During the early years, the Defense Committee was instrumental in the development of a legal framework for the young *Bundeswehr*.<sup>65</sup> Finally, as an additional means of civil control, an independent Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces was installed.<sup>66</sup> This Commissioner oversaw the civil rights of the soldiers and insured adherence to the principles of *Innere Fuehrung*.<sup>67</sup>

In 1956 former proposals for an independent Advisory Council on Questions of *Innere Fuehrung*<sup>68</sup> (*Beirat fuer Fragen der Inneren Fuehrung*) were revived after a dispute between Baudissin and the Minister of Defense.<sup>69</sup> This external forum was designed to support the Minister of Defense in all matters pertaining to *Innere Fuehrung* and to provide independent expert judgment on civil-military issues.<sup>70</sup> The Advisory Council and the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces were responsible for ensuring the implementation of *Innere Fuehrung* in the *Bundeswehr*. Upon entering



the *Bundeswehr*, the citizen would exchange his civilian garb for a uniform, thereby becoming a “citizen in uniform.” Any differences between the *Bundeswehr* and the civilian environment would be justified only by purely military necessity.<sup>71</sup>

In another 1956 democratic initiative, German soldiers were granted the right to elect a spokesperson. This individual person mediated matters between soldiers and their military superiors.<sup>72</sup> In addition, soldiers were granted the right to complain about their superiors and submit petitions to the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces or to the Petitions Committee of the Parliament.<sup>73</sup>

Clearly, German leaders focused on building a legal framework and control system to ensure that the new armed forces would be an integral part of the new democratic Germany.<sup>74</sup> According to Huntington’s theory of civil-military relations, the Germans chose “Subjective Civilian Control” to achieve “its ends by civilizing the [*Bundeswehr*], making them the mirror of the state.”<sup>75</sup> But despite all of these efforts, the concept of *Innere Fuehrung* with its corollary of “citizen in uniform” struggled from the beginning. To construct something completely new, as the Himmerod Memorandum admitted, was not so easy. Military professionals were needed to build up the new armed forces.

So it should be no surprise that 44 former generals and admirals of the *Wehrmacht* were selected to lead the new German military after a parliamentary council (*Personalgutachterausschuss* or *PGA*)<sup>76</sup> investigated their political loyalty and character. No other group in the German society had to undergo such a vetting during post-war reconstruction. The selected group included neither engaged National Socialists nor opponents of the former Nazi regime (because most participants of the resistance had

been killed). Recalling the former *Wehrmacht* flag officers was a political decision with which all parties of the parliament concurred.<sup>77</sup> In spite of this agreement, a split between traditionalists and reformers quickly jeopardized Baudissin's *Innere Fuehrung*.<sup>78</sup> This split necessitated additional trade-offs, and traditional thinking influenced further development and growth.<sup>79</sup> The resulting Himmerod compromise weakened the original intent of reform. The traditionalist group tried to build an "optimized *Wehrmacht*"<sup>80</sup> and thus preserve the strengths of the former organization. Even the U.S. military raised some skeptical questions about the concept of *Innere Fuehrung* and "citizen in uniform." They feared these concepts would make the German contribution to the NATO alliance less effective.<sup>81</sup> Huntington argued that it could "reduce the fighting effectiveness of the new army;" he claimed "a democratic state is better defended by a professional force than a democratic force."<sup>82</sup>

Six years after World War II, it was also not easy to find many democratically oriented German citizens. Post-war Germans did not readily or reflexively regard individual rights as sacrosanct.<sup>83</sup> Even the founding father of *Innere Fuehrung*, Graf von Baudissin, had few illusions that the *Bundeswehr* would conscript democratically oriented citizens.<sup>84</sup> The *Bundeswehr* also attracted more former *Wehrmacht* veterans than was originally projected.<sup>85</sup> So the concept of *Innere Fuehrung* was intended to be the basis for educating the new soldiers on basic democratic rights and rules. In addition, it would expose them, maybe for the first time in their lives, to the new freedom, legitimation, and dignity which they had to defend.

Another problem was a lack of educated company commanders (CoCdrs): Only 44.2% of them had a high school education. CoCdrs were responsible for educating

soldiers on *Innere Fuehrung*. The former commander of the *Bundeswehr Center Innere Fuehrung*, Colonel Hans-Joachim Mueller-Lankow, admitted that most CoCdrs were poor conceptual thinkers and were only marginally qualified for their positions. Indeed, this important group failed to fulfill their new mission to promote *Innere Fuehrung*. Instead they boosted former *Wehrmacht* attitudes.<sup>86</sup> One example of this failure occurred in 1957 when 15 recruits died obeying an unlawful order<sup>87</sup> to cross the river *Iller*.<sup>88</sup> Similarly, in 1962 a soldier died after a 17-kilometer march in the so-called *Nagold* affair. In this soldier's basic training company, located at *Nagold*, abusive and degrading treatment of recruits was common.<sup>89</sup> These incidents suggested that the drill sergeants' mentality and slavish obedience seemed to be a part of the *Bundeswehr*. In 1964 the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, Hellmuth Heye, went public and described this dangerous development within the armed forces. He declaimed the revival of a *Wehrmacht* attitude that was undermining the *Innere Fuehrung*.<sup>90</sup> He even suggested that the *Bundeswehr* could become a "state within the state."<sup>91</sup>

Fifteen years after its creation,<sup>92</sup> the *Bundeswehr* was in a deep crisis; the traditionalists seemed to dominate. The Chief of the Army, Lieutenant General Schnez, supported by most of his top leadership, demanded that German society should adapt to serve the needs of the armed forces. Major General Helmut Grashey denounced *Innere Fuehrung* as little more than a farce.<sup>93</sup> These traditionalists advocated a return to a strong warrior culture. The concept of *Innere Fuehrung*, with its corollary of "citizen in uniform," had obviously failed to permeate post-war Germany's military culture.<sup>94</sup> From its top leaders down to the ranks, *Bundeswehr* personnel regarded themselves as

superior to society at large. *Innere Fuehrung* was at risk. The *Bundeswehr* seemed ready to separate itself from society.

The situation quickly changed when the Social Democrats (*SPD*) produced their first Minister of Defense, Helmut Schmidt, on 19 October 1969.<sup>95</sup> Schmidt proposed a new image for the *Bundeswehr* and a new kind of soldier for the nation.<sup>96</sup> He launched military reform by changing the recruiting policy and the education system for officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). His education reform began with better educated officers. He built two *Bundeswehr* universities and mandated academic education for officers after their basic military training.<sup>97</sup> Relying on Baudissin's ideal of "citizen in uniform," his new recruiting policy for *Bundeswehr* personnel sought to build an army that mirrored the make-up of Germany's pluralistic society. Through these reforms, Schmidt broke the dominance of the old elites and diversified the officer corps.<sup>98</sup>

In addition, Helmut Schmidt led the development of the first Joint Service Regulation *ZDv 10/1* (Assistance for *Innere Fuehrung*, classified: restricted). Because Schmidt was not satisfied with the first drafts of the *ZDv 10/1* proposed by colonels and generals, he ordered a three-day conference for company-level officers to develop the "principles for superiors." This became the third chapter of the new directive.<sup>99</sup> Some of these principles were published in the magazine "*Der Spiegel*" before the release of the directive.<sup>100</sup> The first directive advocated using conscripts to embody the ideal of "citizen in uniform." Schmidt reminded career officers that their view of soldiery may not be shared by all conscripts. The values of the "68-generation" conscripts challenged the norms of the *Bundeswehr*.<sup>101</sup> Germany's army would never be the same.

This military reform revitalized the concept of *Innere Fuehrung* and affirmed the value of the “citizen in uniform.” For the first time in German military history, a strong civil mindset was established to displace the formerly dominant military mindset. The conscript system further ensured a place for the “citizen in uniform.” It forced the elder generation within the *Bundeswehr* to accept the new type of soldier envisioned by Helmut Schmidt.

From this point on, the *Bundeswehr* attempted to operate corporately like any other industry: Its business was peace. The military profession was meant to be like any other in German society. By the mid-1980s the last *Wehrmacht* veterans retired from the *Bundeswehr*.<sup>102</sup> However, reunification of Germany in 1990 quickly brought with it the next paradigm change.

#### Paradigm Change 2: The Integration of Former Soldiers of the National People’s Army

On 1 October 1990, the secession of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) triggered the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. On this same day all generals, admirals, and soldiers older than 55 were retired from the GDR’s National People’s Army (NPA) (*Nationale Volksarmee* or *NVA*).<sup>103</sup> Members of the political cadre and military justice system had been retired earlier.<sup>104</sup> More than 2.5 million East Germans had served in the NPA between 1956 and 1990.<sup>105</sup> At midnight on 3 October 1990, the GDR national service flag was taken down for the last time in all garrisons: The NPA no longer existed.<sup>106</sup> On the same day, 1,200 officers and NCOs from the *Bundeswehr* occupied key positions in the former NPA.<sup>107</sup> They came as Germans to fellow Germans. Their mission was to win the hearts and minds of their former Warsaw Pact adversaries.<sup>108</sup>

In this new security environment, the German military force had to be reduced from 600,000 to 370,000. At the same time, former NPA soldiers were integrated into the *Bundeswehr*.<sup>109</sup> This was not an easy task.<sup>110</sup> NPA soldiers came from a non-democratic society. The NPA was a political army<sup>111</sup> and an instrument of dictatorship.<sup>112</sup> The NPA had played an important role in socializing its young recruits into GDR's communist society.<sup>113</sup> Their soldiers had been indoctrinated to believe that *Innere Fuehrung* and "citizen in uniform" were an anti-democratic creed "to create a human fighting machine, capable of independent, aggressive action and prepared to carry out criminal orders without scruples."<sup>114</sup> Indeed, they claimed that only the NPA within the communist regime could produce a "citizen in uniform."<sup>115</sup> In addition, these soldiers knew nothing of Western Christian values, which were denigrated under the communist regime.<sup>116</sup> Similar to the earlier screening of the *Wehrmacht* veterans, an independent governmental committee screened each East German applicant for *Bundeswehr* service to exclude any with a Stasi<sup>117</sup> background.<sup>118</sup> But despite this screening, approximately 500 officers and 900 NCOs were dismissed from the *Bundeswehr* because they failed to report their Stasi backgrounds.<sup>119</sup>

Whereas *Wehrmacht* veterans joined a newly established military force, these NPA veterans had to integrate into a 45-year-old organization with totally different values and mindset. Also, they would not fill high level leadership positions, as *Wehrmacht* veterans did. Only 10,800<sup>120</sup> former NPA-soldiers were accepted "for a two-year probationary contract."<sup>121</sup> Their *Innere Fuehrung* education began immediately at schools and academies in West Germany. In addition to self-studies, they also received practical training at *Bundeswehr* installations in the West. Mobile training teams

supported their training, and they got practical instruction at their new locations.<sup>122</sup> To continue their service, they had to demonstrate their total assimilation into *Bundeswehr*.

In addition to former NPA soldiers, new conscripts from East Germany had no democratic orientation.<sup>123</sup> They were integrated into the 3-month basic training program with the West German conscripts and trained exclusively in West Germany.<sup>124</sup> This was an important step for building a German “army in unity” that joined together young people from different political systems on a regular basis.<sup>125</sup> These young soldiers were thus exposed to democratic norms and values before they returned to their garrisons and homes in the East. As of 2005, more than 600,000 East German youth had been conscripted into the *Bundeswehr*. The *Bundeswehrs’* commitment to the Basic Law helped to integrate these East Germans into a democratic society.<sup>126</sup> These young soldiers were exposed to the principles of *Innere Fuehrung* during their time in the *Bundeswehr* and to the norms of civil control of the military. Conscription has also been used to train soldiers in democracy and Basic Law. Indeed, as these young East Germans donned their *Bundeswehr* uniforms, they learned not only how to be “citizens in uniform” but also how to be democratic citizens.

After the Cold War, *Innere Fuehrung* remained a foundation of German civil-military relations.<sup>127</sup> However, reunification required an updated *ZDv 10/1* that was released on 16 February 1993. It focused mainly on political education.<sup>128</sup> According to Dr. Carl Gleumes, the internal discussion regarding the value of *Innere Fuehrung* within the *Bundeswehr* ended after the release of this *ZDv*.<sup>129</sup> However, the external discussion did not stop. During the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> parliamentary sessions (2002–2009), the Defense Committee formed a subcommittee tasked to promote *Innere Fuehrung*,

political education, and social responsibility in the *Bundeswehr* to prepare it for new missions.<sup>130</sup> Shortly after integrating former NPA soldiers into its ranks, the *Bundeswehr* faced its third paradigm change: missions abroad.

### Paradigm Change 3: Assignment of New Worldwide Missions

According to the Basic Law, the *Bundeswehr* was authorized only to defend Germany within its borders.<sup>131</sup> All German administrations up to 1990 accepted this mandate. Therefore, missions abroad were conducted only to provide humanitarian support after a catastrophe.<sup>132</sup> This concept began to change with the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a new international security environment.

The *Bundeswehr* did not provide ground troops for the Gulf War, but it did provide 11.8 billion Deutsche Mark to support the operation.<sup>133</sup> The *Bundeswehr's* participation in Cambodia/UNTAC in 1992 was its first real deployment abroad.<sup>134</sup> This was followed by German soldiers' participation in AWACS flights to monitor the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina (DENY-FLIGHT), the UNOSOM II mission in Somalia, and the naval blockade against Serbia and Montenegro (SHARP GUARD). These operations triggered legal complaints from two factional parliamentary parties. On 12 July 1994 the Supreme Court declared that missions abroad conformed with the Basic Law when Parliament authorized such missions.<sup>135</sup> This judicial decree changed "the very nature and character of the German armed forces."<sup>136</sup> An incremental approach was taken to adapt the *Bundeswehr* to its new missions and also to gain society's acceptance of these significant changes.

Yet, ten years after the *Bundeswehr* undertook its first mission, German society seemed reluctant to support these new tasks. When in 2002 former Minister of Defense Peter Struck declared that "Germany's security [was] also defended in the Hindu



Kush,”<sup>137</sup> this assertion triggered a lengthy and heated public discussion. One year later the 2003 defense policy designated worldwide missions as a primary task that required further development of the *Bundeswehr*.<sup>138</sup> Three years later a White Paper specified the most probable tasks for the *Bundeswehr* as: resolution of international conflicts, crisis management, and the war against international terrorism.<sup>139</sup> For the first time, these official documents publically described *Bundeswehr* 's operational reality. But these documents did not foster needed discussion on security policy in the German society. In recent years, operations in Afghanistan have marked the first time since World War II that German soldiers have engaged in combat.<sup>140</sup> When the German people learned that German soldiers were being wounded and killed in Afghanistan, they were gravely surprised. They thought German soldiers were in Afghanistan mostly for “helping, protecting and securing” the Afghan people.<sup>141</sup> The German society needed more time to accommodate to their soldiers' new role as democratic warriors.<sup>142</sup>

As Germany's civilian leadership adapted to the new security environment, some officers who had been serving under the credo that “Our Business is Peace” were unprepared for these changes. Although the 1993 *ZDv 10/1* did not anticipate the demands of missions abroad,<sup>143</sup> the *Bundeswehr Center Innere Fuehrung* was preparing for such change and proactively confronted the new challenges. In 1993, the Center offered a course entitled: “Injury and Death.”<sup>144</sup> The Center also began offering seminars on dealing with stress during missions. The political education curriculum included 15 case studies dealing with complex decision-making in missions abroad. In addition, guidelines for coping with stress before and during missions were distributed.

Starting in 1996, training and teaching materials on the topic “Injury and Death,” including post-traumatic stress syndrome, were available.<sup>145</sup>

Consequently a new generation has emerged: It has been deployed on a regular basis and is suspicious of its superiors who have not deployed. The 2003 Defense Policy Guidelines<sup>146</sup> declared that *Innere Fuehrung* would also adapt to these new tasks. A 2006 White Paper declared that “The tenets of “*Innere Fuehrung*”—leadership development and civic education—will remain the *Bundeswehr*’s guiding principles.”<sup>147</sup> However, critics argued that the change of the *Bundeswehr* mission from defense to conducting worldwide missions rendered *Innere Fuehrung* an archaic ideal—not a viable principle for current missions.<sup>148</sup> At the same time, a group of mission-oriented, technocratic revisionists has replaced the former traditionalists.<sup>149</sup> With them, “old” traditional thinking has returned to some parts of the *Bundeswehr*. This group argues that efficiency in missions is more important than *Innere Fuehrung*. From their point of view, the peacetime concept of *Innere Fuehrung* does not address the realities of current missions. They claim it endangers soldiers’ performance when participating in these missions.<sup>150</sup> Recent scandals in 2004 in Coesfeld and in 2006 in Afghanistan are reminiscent of those that arose when the *Bundeswehr* was first established. Again, unthinking and slavish obedience to authority and lack of human dignity were evident in the recent scandals.<sup>151</sup>

To address these issues, the latest version of the *ZDv 10/1* seeks to restore the value of *Innere Fuehrung* to the mission-orientated *Bundeswehr*.<sup>152</sup> This document has been made available online in a format that appeals to young soldiers. Nonetheless, the

concept of *Innere Fuehrung* remains under stress. As *Bundeswehr* transitions to an all-volunteer force, the 3rd pillar of conscription has been removed from Germany's army.

#### Paradigm Change 4: The Transition to an All-Volunteer Force

On 1 July 2011 the new All-Volunteer *Bundeswehr* was established after 54 years of conscription<sup>153</sup> to adapt to the needs of a more expeditionary global force. After rearmament, the conscript system guaranteed an on-going supply of young men for the *Bundeswehr* and a wide dissemination of the principles of *Innere Fuehrung*. More than eight million Germans have served in the *Bundeswehr*. These veterans have deeply embedded the *Bundeswehr* into the German state and society.<sup>154</sup>

The all-volunteer force will be challenged to sustain this strong link to society, so the army's relationship with the people could be weakened dramatically.<sup>155</sup> Fewer young Germans will join the all-volunteer armed forces, and there is a risk that those who join may come from only a few sectors of society. Wolffsohn, a historian at the *Bundeswehr* University Munich,<sup>156</sup> predicted that the "citizen in uniform" will be replaced by the "underclass in uniform."<sup>157</sup> Indeed, the integration of former NPA soldiers and a disproportionate number of East Germans in the *Bundeswehr* have changed the face of the force. The *Bundeswehr* recruits one-third of its soldiers in the new *Bundeslaender*, where only one-fifth of the German population lives<sup>158</sup>—and where democratic conditions and institutions have a much shorter history. Without the third pillar of conscription,<sup>159</sup> sound civil-military relations must be buttressed by the remaining two pillars (*Innere Fuehrung* and "citizen in uniform") to ensure that the *Bundeswehr* remains nested within German society and the state.

The 2011 Defense Policy Guidelines assert that *Innere Fuehrung* and its corollary of the “citizen in uniform” will remain unchanged.<sup>160</sup> This policy document envisions an expeditionary, combat-ready *Bundeswehr*, accepted within society and the state, with a strong reputation for spreading democratic values worldwide.<sup>161</sup> But to achieve the proposed ends of the Defense Policy Guidelines, a simple transformation will not be sufficient. Instead, a revolutionary and comprehensive approach,<sup>162</sup> led by Parliament, is required. It must ensure adherence to the concept of *Innere Fuehrung* and “citizen in uniform.” The original intent building the *Bundeswehr* in accord with the Basic Law was to avoid creating a “state within the state.” This intent must be preserved. German citizens now have an opportunity to get involved in a vital foreign and security policy discussion, led by Parliament and involving the nation’s politicians. Widespread deliberation of this matter would dispel the “polite disinterest” of German society, as former Federal President, Horst Koehler, described German citizens’ disengagement from civic issues.<sup>163</sup>

Even before the decision to suspend conscription in Germany, many political scientists offered recommendations for adapting *Innere Fuehrung* to these new missions and to an all-volunteer force. According to Wiesendahl,<sup>164</sup> the core principles of *Innere Fuehrung* (primacy of civilian authority, respect of the Basic Law, and integration within state and society) must remain unchanged. So long as other adaptations of *Bundeswehr* do not violate *Innere Fuehrung*, such adaptations should proceed to make the *Bundeswehr* a viable 21<sup>st</sup> century armed force.<sup>165</sup> A recent flurry of studies on the new missions and an all-volunteer force<sup>166</sup> provides abundant material for broad public discussion of the future role of the *Bundeswehr*.

The Parliament, including the chancellor, must take the lead in assuring the *Innere Fuehrung* and the “citizen in uniform” retain their fundamental roles in the all-volunteer force because the Parliament is the constitutional leader of the army. This adaptation is as critical as the post-war rearmament of Germany; it should attract the same level of scrutiny. The Defense Committee should be tasked to revive the subcommittee for “*advancement of Innere Fuehrung*.” It should work from the very beginning with *Bundeswehr* leaders and the ministerial department of *Innere Fuehrung* to devise ways to embed this principle in the new all-volunteer force.<sup>167</sup> The Parliamentary Commissioner and the independent Advisory Council on Questions of *Innere Fuehrung* should be included in this deliberation. These four groups share responsibility for further development of *Innere Fuehrung*. The *Bundeswehr* Association,<sup>168</sup> with its unlimited access to the public and its direct access to the Minister of Defense, should contribute to the process. The Parliamentary Commissioner would then handle the implementation, as directed by law. These groups should also ensure that the military recruiting and incentives programs<sup>169</sup> are financed in such a way that they increase diversity, attract the right volunteers, and retain the best soldiers in the *Bundeswehr*.

Education should also be a major component of this transition. In comparison to the former conscript *Bundeswehr*, the volunteers will require an extended education in ethics, history, and politics to compensate for some lack of education and to meet the higher standards of an expeditionary force. The civil education of officers and NCOs must be aligned to assure the army’s linkage to society and to facilitate reintegration of veterans into society. In addition, *Bundeswehr* exchange programs with industry and

government agencies should be established to support integration, linkage, and mutual understanding. To sustain links with society, *Bundeswehr* military careers could mirror those of the U.S. Army, which offers career officers abundant opportunities for education and internships with civilian universities, other agencies, and private business. Officers who pursue these opportunities should also be favored for promotion. Likewise, *Bundeswehr* civilians should study together with the soldiers at the *Bundeswehr* Universities to ensure network-building and bonding.<sup>170</sup>

As in Baudissin's time, the *Innere Fuehrung* department should be posted directly under the *GenInsp* as a clear signal of its fundamental importance.<sup>171</sup> In addition, *GenInsp*'s assistant for education and training should become a "Management assistant for *Innere Fuehrung*," who reports to the *GenInsp* and Defense Committee. The *Bundeswehr* Institute for Social Sciences<sup>172</sup> should be tasked with conducting annual surveys on *Innere Fuehrung*, and the results should be presented directly to the Parliamentary Commissioner.<sup>173</sup> Finally, an information campaign on all levels should be designed and implemented to gain trust in our leader's ability to successfully transform the all-volunteer armed forces.

### Summary

With its 55 years of successful history, the *Bundeswehr* has already doubled the lifetime of the *Reichswehr* and *Wehrmacht* combined. *Innere Fuehrung*, with its vital corollary of "citizen in uniform," has ensured that the *Bundeswehr* has served as a democratically structured and operated armed force that has been widely accepted by the German people. This dynamic concept was challenged from the beginning, but it has always adapted to the complex and uncertain strategic environment by adhering to its unchangeable core values (consistent with the Basic Law). With its transition to an

all-volunteer *Bundeswehr*, the pillar of conscription is no longer available. Accordingly, its other two pillars supporting civil-military relations must be strengthened so that they can compensate for this loss. A simple transformation process will not be sufficient. A revolutionary process, like the one that launched the *Bundeswehr*, is needed. This process must be led by the ultimate master of the *Bundeswehr*, the Parliament. It should include all groups of society to assure that the *Bundeswehr* remains an integrated and regularly monitored part of the German society and the state.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> [German] Federal Ministry of Defense Home Page, "History of the Bundeswehr," February 23, 2011: "[The armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany] have been officially called Bundeswehr since April 1, 1956. Own translation from: "Seit dem 1. April 1956 heißen diese Streitkräfte „Bundeswehr“." [http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/DcoxDoAgDADAt\\_iBdnfzF-oG2NAGBEIrfF9y6-GNS3FDojOpxWU88Qgy-wn-HRFUAINnEtNWs5gk8F95SCdxh0gaeA0jbOnYfrVt\\_C4!/](http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/DcoxDoAgDADAt_iBdnfzF-oG2NAGBEIrfF9y6-GNS3FDojOpxWU88Qgy-wn-HRFUAINnEtNWs5gk8F95SCdxh0gaeA0jbOnYfrVt_C4!/) (accessed November 11, 2011).

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Franz Josef Jung, "Tagesbefehl des Bundesministers der Verteidigung (Order of the Day of the Minister of Defense)," Bonn, January 28, 2011: "The *Innere Fuehrung* with its corollary of "citizen in uniform" greatly contributed to the fact that the *Bundeswehr* became not only a self evident part of our society but also a reliable instrument of German security policies." Own translation from: "Die Innere Fuehrung hat mit Ihrem Leitbild vom "Staatsbuerger in Uniform" wesentlich dazu beigetragen, dass die Bundeswehr zu einem selbstverstaendlichen Bestandteil unserer Gesellschaft und zu einem zuverlaessigen Instrument deutscher Sicherheitspolitik geworden ist." The order of the day of the German Minister of Defense is available in the German version of *Innere Fuehrung (Leadership Development and Civic Education)*, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1 (Bonn: Joint Forces Staff (Fue S I 4), January 28, 2008) only. [http://www.innerefuehrung.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/zinfue/!ut/p/c4/JYvLCslwEEX\\_aCaVatWdDwQV1J3WjSTtWGLSpMSJgvixJngPnM3h4hUTTr50J1I7Jy1esG70XL3hadTto909EkjDkawlCJEao-AxEmKK5\\_xtCRviLOZHOvkLkj2AQYf2OYSQ0gFdlu1KNZLUYqJ-K\\_4VqvZfneqyvH2sDni0PeLH0blQeM!/](http://www.innerefuehrung.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/zinfue/!ut/p/c4/JYvLCslwEEX_aCaVatWdDwQV1J3WjSTtWGLSpMSJgvixJngPnM3h4hUTTr50J1I7Jy1esG70XL3hadTto909EkjDkawlCJEao-AxEmKK5_xtCRviLOZHOvkLkj2AQYf2OYSQ0gFdlu1KNZLUYqJ-K_4VqvZfneqyvH2sDni0PeLH0blQeM!/) (accessed December 6, 2011).

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Germany Homepage, "Documents on the Foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949," August 2001, <http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga4-490512.htm> (accessed November 11, 2011).

<sup>4</sup> Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 41: "During 1948-49, the founders of the Federal Republic wrote a provisional constitution—the Basic Law—which has proved as

successful as any in German history. This document assured the rights of the citizen as never before in German past. The framers of Basic Law consciously sought to prevent the recurrence of the political abuses of the Weimar constitution and the illegalities of the Nazi regime. In so doing, they established the standard by which the future German soldier would judge his heritage, and offered the citizens of the nascent Federal Republic an image of military service that would correspond with the pluralistic spirit of the age.”

<sup>5</sup> Deutscher Bundestag, “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany,” October 2010, trans. Professor Christian Tomuschat and Professor David P. Currie, trans. revised Professor Christian Tomuschat and Professor Donald P. Kommers in cooperation with the Language Service of the German Bundestag, 11, <https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf> (accessed November 1, 2011).

<sup>6</sup> For an English translation of the original version, see Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe (CVCE), “The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG),” May 23, 1949, [http://www.cvce.eu/obj/The\\_Basic\\_Law\\_of\\_the\\_FRG\\_23\\_May\\_1949-en-7fa618bb-604e-4980-b667-76bf0cd0dd9b.html](http://www.cvce.eu/obj/The_Basic_Law_of_the_FRG_23_May_1949-en-7fa618bb-604e-4980-b667-76bf0cd0dd9b.html) (accessed December 3, 2011); Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Urfassung vom 23. Mai 1949, <http://www.flegel-g.de/urfassung-GG.html> (accessed December 3, 2011).

<sup>7</sup> Bruno Thoss, “Zwei Wege – ein Ziel: Der Weg der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ins Buendnis,” in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden: 50 Jahre Bundeswehr, 1955 bis 2005* (Freiburg i.Br./Berlin: Rombach, 2005), 39; Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 43: “Two months after the outbreak of the war in Korea, Winston Churchill demanded a West German contribution to the European defense.”

<sup>8</sup> Dieter Wellershoff, “Das ganze vor seinen Teilen sehen: Zur Inneren und aeusseren Integration unserer Bundeswehr in ihrer fuenfzigjaehrigen Geschichte,” in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 20; Markus Reinhardt, *Civil-Military Relations in the European Union and “Innere Fuehrung,”* Master’s thesis (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2010), 5-6; Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 64-65.

<sup>9</sup> Anja-Dalgaard Nielsen, *Germany, pacifism and peace enforcement* (Manchester: University Press, 2006), 27.

<sup>10</sup> Steven J. Bradey, *Eisenhower and Adenauer: Alliance Maintenance under Pressure, 1953–1960* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010), 107; Mark S. Milosch, *Modernizing Bavaria: the politics of Franz Josef Strauss and the CSU, 1949–1969* (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006), 29: “the great majority of Germans opposed rearmament.”

<sup>11</sup> Klaus-Juergen Bremm, Hans-Hubertus Mack, Martin Rink, *Entschieden fuer den Frieden: 50 Jahre Bundeswehr, 1955 bis 2005* (Freiburg i.Br./Berlin: Rombach, 2005), 3.

<sup>12</sup> Georg Heinrich Klippel, *Das Leben des Generals von Scharnhorst*, Dritter Theil, Fuenftes und sechstes Buch, 1801–1813 (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1871), 294: On 17 July 1807, a few days after the Peace of Tilsit, the King of Prussia promoted Scharnhorst to Major General and gave him the lead of the army reform commission; Ibid., 337-338, 342-356: Scharnhorst could be seen as the founding father of conscription in Prussia. To find acceptance for that concept the soldiers rights and responsibilities had to be changed in such a way that the citizens would



accept the draft. Therefore, he could also be seen as the founding father of the corollary “citizen in uniform.”

<sup>13</sup> Rudolf J. Schlaffer, Wolfgang Schmidt, *Wolf Graf von Baudissin 1907-1993: Modernisierer zwischen totalitaerer Herrschaft und freiheitlicher Ordnung* (Muenchen: R. Oldenbourg, 2007), VII-VIII; Klaus-Juergen Bremm, Hans-Hubertus Mack, Martin Rink, *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 3-4; [German] Federal Ministry of Defense Home Page, “History of the Bundeswehr,” September 23, 2011: “three months later, the volunteer army became a conscript army.”  
[http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/FcwxDoAgDEDRG7W7m6dQ3AAbaIRCKML1xfz15eOFK7GDq-1cxCY80Xje3ASXRwBIH6IF4q61JO78gHvIJp0UGwRSH5fohMc\\_SgENCdac9w8ftXfP/](http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/FcwxDoAgDEDRG7W7m6dQ3AAbaIRCKML1xfz15eOFK7GDq-1cxCY80Xje3ASXRwBIH6IF4q61JO78gHvIJp0UGwRSH5fohMc_SgENCdac9w8ftXfP/) (accessed December 6, 2011).

<sup>14</sup> Ute Frevert, *A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society* (Oxford: Berg, 2004), 267; Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, *The rebirth of the West: The Americanization of the democratic world, 1945–1958* (Boston: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992), 386.

<sup>15</sup> *Jewish Virtual Library Home Page*,  
<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/source/biography/Heusinger.html> (accessed December 7, 2011); *Stiftung Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Home Page*,  
<http://www.hdg.de/lemo/html/biografien/HeusingerAdolf/index.html> (accessed December 7, 2011).

<sup>16</sup> *Das Bundesarchiv Home Page*, “Das deutsche Militaerwesen - Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1990,” April 21, 2010, 16:46, 3-11,  
[http://www.bundesarchiv.de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/bilder\\_dokumente/01725/index-2.html.de](http://www.bundesarchiv.de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/bilder_dokumente/01725/index-2.html.de) (accessed November 11, 2011); Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 53-63: On page 53, Abenheim describes the illegal meeting at Himmerod: “In the strict legal sense, such a gathering was unconstitutional; the allies could punish the participants with life imprisonment for engaging in secret military preparations. With this possibility much on their minds, the group met in great secrecy at the Abbey Himmerod in the Eifel Mountains for four days in October 1950;” for background on the Himmerod Memorandum, see David Clay Large, *Germans to the front: West German rearmament in the Adenauer era* (North Carolina, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 97-103; and especially Prof. Dr. Holger H. Herwig, “Aggression Contained? The Federal Republic of Germany and International Security,” The University of Calgary, 3-34,  
<http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/herwig.pdf> (accessed February 29, 2012); Jens-Olaf Koltermann, e-mail message to Prof. Dr. Holger H. Herwig, March 4, 2012: Prof. Herwig could not recall the date of publication of his paper. He stated that the paper “was only printed electronically.”

<sup>17</sup> Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 56-67; Klaus Ebeling, Anja Seiffert, Rainer Senger, “Ethische Fundamente der Inneren Fuehrung,” *SOWI-Arbeitspapier*, no. 132 (Strausberg: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr (Bundeswehr Institute for Social Science) May 2002), 7; James Sperling, *Germany at fifty-five: Berlin ist nicht Bonn?* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2004), 332; Manfred Messerschmidt, Christian Greiner, Norbert Wiggershaus, “West Germany’s Strategic Position and her Role in Defence Policy as seen by the German Military, 1945-1949,” in *Power in Europe?: Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany in a Postwar World 1945-1950*, ed. Josef Becker and Franz Knipping (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1986), 360.

[illegible]

<sup>21</sup> Matthias Molt, *Von der Wehrmacht zur Bundeswehr: Personelle Kontinuität und Diskontinuität beim Aufbau der Deutschen Streitkräfte 1955–1966*, Dissertation (Heidelberg: Philosophische Fakultät der Ruprecht-Karls-Universität, 2007), 31: The founding fathers are Generalleutnant (ret.) Wolf Graf Baudissin, General (ret.) Johann Adolf Graf Kielmansegg and General (ret.) Ulrich de Maizière.

<sup>23</sup> Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 59-60.

<sup>25</sup> Donald Abenheim, *The Citizen in Uniform: Reform and its Critics in the Bundeswehr*, Final Report (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, February 1988), 2-6; Maj. Petra

McGregor, USAF gave the following description in her article: "Innere Fuehrung in German Civil-Military Relations," *Strategic Insights*, Volume V, Issue 4 (April 2006): "The literal translation of "Innere Fuehrung" is "inner leadership." The more commonly used translation is "leadership and civic education." However, the complexity of the concept does not allow for a simple definition or accurate translation. *Innere Fuehrung* is better understood as a leadership philosophy that ties professional ethics to the values of democracy and thus presents the corporate culture of the German armed forces."

<sup>26</sup> The [German] Federal Minister of Defense, *Innere Fuehrung*, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1 (2008), Preliminary remarks: "1. This joint service regulation defines the concept of *Innere Fuehrung* (leadership development and civic education). It is the most important regulation for service in the *Bundeswehr*. 2. It contains fundamental statements on the self-image of soldiers in a democracy. The main element of the concept of *Innere Fuehrung* is the guiding principle of the "citizen in uniform." 3. *Innere Fuehrung* ensures that *Bundeswehr* soldiers are part of society and places an obligation on the armed forces to uphold the law and military discipline. It sets the tone of leadership culture in the *Bundeswehr*. 4. Joint Service Regulation 10/1 (*Innere Fuehrung*) is directed at all *Bundeswehr* personnel, in particular superiors. They are responsible for implementing the principles of *Innere Fuehrung* in a wide range of areas."

<sup>27</sup> Meyer, *The Concept of "Innere Fuehrung,"* 36; Michael G. Lux, *Innere Fuehrung: A Superior Concept of Leadership*, Master's Thesis (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2008), 50-60.

<sup>28</sup> McGregor, "The Role of Innere Fuehrung;" One of the best definitions in German language, see Detlef Bald (1994) quoted in Aurell Croissant, David Kuehn, *Militaer und Politik* (Muenchen: Oldenbourg, 2011), 85.

<sup>29</sup> [German] Federal Ministry of Defense Home Page, "Innere Fuehrung (Leadership and Civic Education) and the Citizen in Uniform," February 21, 2011, [http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/Fcw5EoAgDEDRG5HezIO4NA5gDBkhMKzXF-dXr\\_lwwkx0Z9KVo2qPOxyWFzOUCZ1UYeswO-RaUvRc-VWmyY1loMuKRTDj9bSJJgTbf\\_MEBwqkENYPn9-ejA!/](http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/Fcw5EoAgDEDRG5HezIO4NA5gDBkhMKzXF-dXr_lwwkx0Z9KVo2qPOxyWFzOUCZ1UYeswO-RaUvRc-VWmyY1loMuKRTDj9bSJJgTbf_MEBwqkENYPn9-ejA!/) (accessed November 11, 2011).

<sup>30</sup> Meyer, *The Concept of "Innere Fuehrung,"* 8.

<sup>31</sup> Sabine Manitz, "Redefining Soldierly Role Models in Germany," *Armed Forces & Society Online*, version September 27, 2011, originally published online August 5, 2011, 686, in ProQuest (accessed November 11, 2011); Meyer, *The Concept of "Innere Fuehrung,"* 8.

<sup>32</sup> The [German] Federal Minister of Defense, *Innere Fuehrung*, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1 (2008), no. 308, annex 2/2: Section 11 of *Soldatengesetz* (SG) (Legal Status of Military Personnel Act) describes the significance and limits of obedience as follows: "The significance and limits of obedience are legally defined in order to rule out abuse of the duty to obey orders: [a] Orders may be issued by superiors only; superiors are specified in the Ministerial Directive Governing Superior-Subordinate Relations (Section 1(3) SG, Sections 1 to 6 VorgV [Ministerial Directive Governing Superior-Subordinate Relations]). [b] Ignoring an order that violates human dignity, that was not given for service related purposes (Section 11(1) SG), or the observance of which would be unacceptable is not disobedience. [c] Orders that entail committing a crime must not be obeyed (Section 11(2) SG). Criminal acts are governed by the

Criminal Code, the Military Penal Code, and other penal acts (Joint Service Regulation ZDv 14/2). [d] Freedom of conscience (Article 4(1) GG [Basic Law]) guarantees that the state does not have the right to force an individual to commit acts that violate ethical standards of good and evil.”

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., no. 625, 22.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., Chapter 6-II and 6-III: Other areas of application are: Training and the Organization of Military Duty, Information Activities, Organization and Personnel Management, Welfare and Recreation, Compatibility of Family and Duty, Pastoral Care and the Practice of Religion, and Medical Care.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., no. 308, annex 2/1: “a) Equal rights and equal treatment (Article 3 GG [Basic Law]) as well as the equality of civic status (Article 33 GG) by Section 3 and 6 SG [Legal Status of Military Personnel Act]; b) The right to practice religion freely (Article 4 GG) by Section 36 SG; Ulrich de Maizièrre, “Was war neu an der Bundeswehr? Betrachtungen eines Zeitzeugen,” in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 14: The additional duties were compensated by the legal rights for complaint, election of spokespersons, the abandonment of military courts and the institution of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces.

<sup>36</sup> Deutscher Bundestag, “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany,” 24-25: “Article 17a [Restriction of basic rights in specific instances], (1) Laws regarding military and alternative service may provide that the basic right of members of the Armed Forces and of alternative service freely to express and disseminate their opinions in speech, writing and pictures (first clause of paragraph (1) of Article 5), the basic right of assembly (Article 8), and the right of petition (Article 17) insofar as it permits the submission of requests or complaints jointly with others, be restricted during their period of military or alternative service. (2) Laws regarding defense, including protection of the civilian population, may provide for restriction of the basic rights of freedom of movement (Article 11) and inviolability of the home (Article 13).”

<sup>37</sup> Wilfried von Bredow, “Conscription, Conscientious Objection, and Civic Service: The Military Institutions and Political Culture of Germany, 1945 to the present,” *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Vol. 20, no. 2 (Winter 1992): 291: “One of the “lessons of the past” concerning civil-military relations in the Federal Republic seemed to be the necessity for general conscription as an organizational device to counteract anti-democratic political ambitions of the officer corps of the armed forces.”

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 292: “the public perception of conscription being the “legitimate child of democracy” (President Heuss) slowly became part of the West German political culture;” Stephan Pfaffen-zeller, “Conscription and Democracy: The Mythology of Civil-Military Relations,” *Armed Forces & Society Online*, version March 18, 2010, originally published online 13 November 2009, 485, <http://afs.sagepub.com/content/36/3/481> (accessed February 26, 2012).

<sup>39</sup> Bredow, “Conscription, Conscientious Objection, and Civic Service,” 292.

<sup>40</sup> The [German] Federal Minister of Defense, *Innere Fuehrung*, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1 (2008), no. 303, 10: the *Bundeswehr* is built on “ethical, legal, political and social foundations and meets military demands.”

<sup>41</sup> Eberhard Kolb, *The Weimar Republic*, trans. P.S. Falla and R.J. Park (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 172; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 109-113.

<sup>42</sup> Wolfram Wette, *The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality*, trans. Deborah Lucas Schneider (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 2-3.

<sup>43</sup> Meyer, *The Concept of "Innere Fuehrung,"* 8: Meyer translated *Innere Fuehrung* in this research paper as "internal microstructure;" Berthold Meyer, "Innere Fuehrung und Auslandseinsatze: Was wird aus dem Markenzeichen der Bundeswehr?," *HFSK-Report*, Nr. 02/2009 (Frankfurt: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK), Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2008): 5: Meyer explains that the Himmerod Memorandum makes proposals for the macro- and microstructure of a future German contingent within a European Army; Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 59: Abenheim translates "*Inneres Gefuege*" as "inner structure."

<sup>44</sup> de Maizière, "Was war neu an der Bundeswehr?," in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 11.

<sup>45</sup> Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 59-62; *Das Bundesarchiv Home Page*, "Das deutsche Militärwesen - Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1990," 3.

<sup>46</sup> Jared Donnelly, B.A., *Public Opinion of Conscription in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1954-1956*, Thesis prepared for the Degree of Masters of Arts (Texas: University of North Texas, May 2009), 10, in ProQuest (accessed November 12, 2011); Donald Abenheim, *Soldiers and Politics Transformed: German-American Reflections on Civil-Military Relations in a New Strategic Environment* (Berlin: Carola Hartman Miles, 2007), 84.

<sup>47</sup> Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 80: "The Adenauer government agreed that the future soldier should be subordinate to civilian control as never before in German history." and 81: "by subordinating the new armed forces to parliamentary control, finally fulfilling the liberal hopes for the soldiers and the state in German history."

<sup>48</sup> Dieter Wellershoff, "Das ganze vor seinen Teilen sehen," in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 22-23; Deutscher Bundestag, "Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany," 73-74: "Article 87b [Federal Defence Administration, added March 19, 1956] (1) The Federal Defence Administration shall be conducted as a federal administrative authority with its own administrative substructure. It shall have jurisdiction for personnel matters and direct responsibility for satisfaction of the procurement needs of the Armed Forces. Responsibilities connected with pensions for injured persons or with construction work may be assigned to the Federal Defence Administration only by a federal law requiring the consent of the *Bundesrat*. Such consent shall also be required for any laws to the extent that they empower the Federal Defence Administration to interfere with rights of third parties; this requirement, however, shall not apply in the case of laws regarding personnel matters. (2) In addition, federal laws concerning defence, including recruitment for military service and protection of the civilian population, may, with the consent of the *Bundesrat*, provide that they shall be executed, wholly or in part, either by federal administrative authorities with their own administrative substructures or by the *Länder* on federal commission. If such laws are executed by the *Länder* on federal commission, they may, with the consent of the *Bundesrat*, provide that the powers vested in the Federal Government or in the competent highest federal authorities pursuant to Article 85 be transferred wholly or in part to federal higher authorities; in this event the law may provide that



such authorities shall not require the consent of the *Bundesrat* in issuing general administrative rules pursuant to the first sentence of paragraph (2) of Article 85;" For dates of amendments, see "Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany," (Promulgated by the Parliamentary Council on 23 May 1949) as Amended by the Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990 and Federal Statute of 23 September 1990, <http://www.constitution.org/cons/germany.txt> (accessed November 12, 2011).

<sup>49</sup> Hans-Juergen Rautenberg, "Streitkraefte und Spitzengliederung – zum Verhaeltnis von ziviler und bewaffneter Macht bis 1990," in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 113-114.

<sup>50</sup> For a biography of General (ret.) Ulrich de Maizière, see Ulrich de Maizière, "Was war neu in der Bundeswehr? Betrachtungen eines Zeitzeugen zum 50-jaehrigen Jubilaem. Eine Armee ist nie "fertig"," March 16, 2005, 2, [http://www.clausewitz-gesellschaft.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Vortraege/VO\\_deMaiziere.pdf](http://www.clausewitz-gesellschaft.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Vortraege/VO_deMaiziere.pdf) (accessed December 6, 2011).

<sup>51</sup> de Maizière, "Was war neu an der Bundeswehr?," in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 11-15.

<sup>52</sup> Deutscher Bundestag, "Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany," 30: Article 24 (2) "Transfer of sovereign powers—System of collective Security" explains the integration in a mutual security collective system: "With a view to maintaining peace, the Federation may enter into a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations upon its sovereign powers as will bring about and secure a lasting peace in Europe and among the nations of the world."

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 73: Article 87a Armed Forces was added March 19, 1956: "(1) The Federation shall establish Armed Forces for purposes of defence. Their numerical strength and general organizational structure must be shown in the budget. (2) Apart from defence, the Armed Forces may be employed only to the extent expressly permitted by this Basic Law. (3) During a state of defence or a state of tension the Armed Forces shall have the power to protect civilian property and to perform traffic control functions to the extent necessary to accomplish their defence mission. Moreover, during a state of defence or a state of tension, the Armed Forces may also be authorised to support police measures for the protection of civilian property; in this event the Armed Forces shall cooperate with the competent authorities. (4) In order to avert an imminent danger to the existence or free democratic basic order of the Federation or of a Land, the Federal Government, if the conditions referred to in paragraph (2) of Article 91 obtain and the police forces and the Federal Border Police prove inadequate, may employ the Armed Forces to support the police and the Federal Border Police in protecting civilian property and in combating organised armed insurgents. Any such employment of the Armed Forces shall be discontinued if the *Bundestag* or the *Bundesrat* so demands."

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 30: "Article 26 [Securing international peace] (1) Acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression, shall be unconstitutional. They shall be made a criminal offence;" Donald Abenheim, *German Soldier and German Unity: Political Foundations of the German Armed Forces*, Final Report (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, January 1991), 12.

<sup>55</sup> de Maizière, "Was war neu an der Bundeswehr?," in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 12-13: In addition, the military territorial tasks and the civil administration were joint down to the

garrison. The same applies for the areas of security policy, military reconnaissance, military law and *Innere Fuehrung*.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 13-14; Uwe Hartmann, *Innere Fuehrung: Erfolge und Defizite der Fuehrungsphilosophie der Bundeswehr* (Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles, 2007), 31-34.

<sup>57</sup> Dan van der Vaart, "General Johann Adolf Graf von Kielmansegg: German general who served in his country's army from the Weimar republic to Nato," *The Guardian Online*, June 6, 2006, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2006/jun/07/guardianobituaries.secondworldwar> (accessed December 7, 2011); Juergen Rose, "Demokratisierung der Bundeswehr als Schritt auf dem Weg zum Frieden: Anmerkungen zu den Zivilisierungsperspektiven einer autoritaeren Institution," 2011, 9: In 1953, General Johann Adolf Graf von Kielmansegg, a close assistant to Baudissin, demanded an "army within a democracy" but also "democracy within the army." Unfortunately, he did not explain in detail what he meant by "democracy within the army." Even so, he clearly advocated a fundamentally distinct and new approach similar to that of Baudissin and his reformist group, <http://www.uni-marburg.de/konfliktforschung/publikationen/wp14.pdf> (accessed December 6, 2011).

<sup>58</sup> Detlef Bald, "Militärreform und Grundgesetz: Zum Konzept der 'Inneren Führung'," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (APuZ 21/2005): "It is significant, that still in September 1955 even Heusinger and Speidel announced their skepticism on the primacy of the civilian in the *Bundeswehr* to the chancellor." Own translation from: "Es ist bezeichnend, dass noch im September 1955 sogar Heusinger und Speidel gegenüber dem Kanzler ihre Zweifel am Primat des Zivilen in der Bundeswehr äußerten." [http://www.bpb.de/popup/popup\\_druckversion.html?guid=FQNO6C&page=0](http://www.bpb.de/popup/popup_druckversion.html?guid=FQNO6C&page=0) (accessed December 6, 2011)

<sup>59</sup> Rautenberg, "Streitkraefte und Spitzengliederung," in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 113-114. See also footnote no. 49.

<sup>60</sup> Deutscher Bundestag, "Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany," 73: For details on Article 87a (3) [Armed Forces], see footnote 53; "Afghanistan: Guttenberg sieht kriegsähnliche Zustände," *Der Tagesspiegel Online*, November 3, 2009: After 1945, the word "war" is not commonly used in Germany. During the Cold War, the *Bundeswehr* was a Defense Armed Force and was trained for the mission of defense. After soldiers were involved in real fighting in Afghanistan they didn't understand the academic debate over these words. Former Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg first used the words "*kriegsähnliche Zustände*" (warlike conditions) to describe the situation in parts of Afghanistan. <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/international/guttenberg-sieht-kriegsaehnliche-zustaende/1627038.html> (accessed November 12, 2011); After a short time, Chancellor Angela Merkel used the same expression, see "Merkel: "Kriegsähnliche Zustände" in Afghanistan," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Online*, faz.net, November 13, 2009, <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/bundeswehr-einsatz-merkel-kriegsaehnliche-zustaende-in-afghanistan-1882100.html> (accessed November 12, 2011).

<sup>61</sup> Deutscher Bundestag, "Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany," 108: "Article 115b [Power of command of the Federal Chancellor] Upon the promulgation of a state of defense the power of command over the Armed Forces shall pass to the Federal Chancellor."

<sup>62</sup> Bald, "Militärreform und Grundgesetz:" The topmost soldier, the *Generalinspekteur* is not the deputy of the Minister of Defense; his position is under the Parliamentary State Secretary. This arrangement should document the status of the military as advisor of the policy and as part of the executive—a primacy of civilian balance of power." Own Translation from: "Der oberste Soldat, der Generalinspekteur, ist nicht Stellvertreter des Ministers; er folgt im Rang nach dem Parlamentarischen Staatssekretär. Diese Ordnung soll den Status des Militärs als Berater der Politik und als Teil der Exekutive dokumentieren—ein Vorrang ziviler Machtbalance." [http://www.bpb.de/popup/popup\\_druckversion.html?guid=FQNO6C&page=0](http://www.bpb.de/popup/popup_druckversion.html?guid=FQNO6C&page=0) (accessed December 6, 2011); Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 168.

<sup>63</sup> *Deutscher Bundestag Home Page*, "Defence Committee," [http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs\\_e/bundestag/committees/a12/index.html](http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/committees/a12/index.html) (accessed November 12, 2011).

<sup>64</sup> Ibid. "The Defence Committee as a committee of inquiry:" "The Defence Committee has a special status as the only committee with the right to convene as a committee of inquiry (Article 45a (2) of the Basic Law, Germany's constitution)." [http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs\\_e/bundestag/committees/a12/aufgaben/aufg04.html](http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/committees/a12/aufgaben/aufg04.html) (accessed February 26, 2012).

<sup>65</sup> Ibid. "Functions: Involvement in legislation," [http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs\\_e/bundestag/committees/a12/aufgaben/aufg02.html](http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/committees/a12/aufgaben/aufg02.html) (accessed February 26, 2012).

<sup>66</sup> Rudolf Schlaffer, "Der Wehrbeauftragte – Kontrolleur der inneren Entwicklung der Bundeswehr," in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 398: The Swedish 'Militie-Ombudsman' was taken as an example for this institution. Some parliamentarian feared that this institution would undermine the confidence between superiors and subordinates; *Deutscher Bundestag Home Page*, "Armed Forces Commissioner," [http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs\\_e/bundestag/commissioner/index.html](http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/commissioner/index.html) (accessed November 12, 2011).

<sup>67</sup> Deutscher Bundestag, "Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany," 40-41: "Article 45b [Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, added March 22, 1956] A Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces shall be appointed to safeguard basic rights and to assist the Bundestag in exercising parliamentary oversight over the Armed Forces. Details shall be regulated by a federal law;" "Gesetz über den Wehrbeauftragten des Deutschen Bundestages (Gesetz zu Artikel 45b des Grundgesetzes—WBeauftrG)," Law for the Parliamentary Commissioner of the German Parliament (Law to Article 45b of the Basic Law—WBeauftrG): The term "principles of *Innere Fuehrung*" was integrated without any explanation into the legislative article establishing the Parliamentary Commissioner, see: "Article 1 (3), Verfassungsrechtliche Stellung (Constitutional Status), Aufgaben(Tasks), <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/wehrbttg/gesamt.pdf> (accessed November 12, 2011).

<sup>68</sup> For a description of the history of the Council and a comparison to the RAND Corporation, see Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 94.

<sup>69</sup> Eberhard Stammler, "Vom Kalten Krieg zur Deutschen Einheit: Analysen und Zeitzeugenberichte zur deutschen Militaergeschichte 1945 bis 1995," ed. Bruno Thoss with cooperation of Wolfgang Schmidt (Muenchen: Oldenbourg, 1995), 331-338: Some external



persuasion and pressure on Federal Minister of Defense Franz Josef Strauss, and the perspective of positive public feedback, helped establish this advisory council in 1958.

<sup>70</sup> Erlass ueber die Bildung eines Beirates fuer Fragen der Inneren Fuehrung in der Fassung vom 24. Januar 1969, VMBI 1969, Nr. 5, S. 93; The [German] Federal Minister of Defense, *Innere Fuehrung*, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1 (2008), 4; Meyer, *The Concept of "Innere Fuehrung,"* 9.

<sup>71</sup> BrigGen Karl H. Schreiner, "Citizen in Uniform: Overview and Issues," Conference Report, *Citizen in Uniform: Implementing Human Rights in the Armed Forces*, Berlin 7-8 September [2006], <http://www.osce.org/odihr/22130> (accessed December 6, 2011).

<sup>72</sup> Andreas Gromius, "Die Beteiligungsrechte der Vertrauensperson in der Bundeswehr: Erlaeuterungen zum Soldatenbeteiligungsgesetz," ed. Oberstleutnant Martin Berg, 15: This recalled a Weimar Republic tradition within the *Reichswehr*. <http://www.walhall.de/static/leseprobe/6244600.pdf> (accessed December 6, 2011)

<sup>73</sup> Dr. jur. Dirk W. Oetting, *Das Beschwerderecht des Soldaten*, Schriften zum oeffentlichen Recht, Band 35 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1966), 127-135; Chart "Beschwerde" (complaints) <http://www.deutsches-wehrrecht.de/Beschwerderecht.pdf> (accessed December 6, 2011)

<sup>74</sup> Abenheim explains four major features of the Bundeswehr to ensure integration, see Abenheim, *German Soldier and German Unity*, 10-15.

<sup>75</sup> Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 83: Objective Civilian Control on the other hand "achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state."

<sup>76</sup> For background on the Personnel Screening Boards (*Personalgutachterausschuss*), see Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 136-147.

<sup>77</sup> Reinhard Stumpf, "Die Wiederverwendung von Generalen und die Neubildung militaerischer Eliten in Deutschland und Oesterreich nach 1945," in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 82, 84, 86-88: There were 83 applicants from which the Parliamentary Council chose 61 and rejected 8. 13 applicants withdrew on their own. In the fall 1957, 44 former generals and admirals of the *Wehrmacht* joined the new *Bundeswehr*. Most of them joined with their former rank, eight of them at a one rank reduction.

<sup>78</sup> Uwe Hartmann, "Baudissin und die Weiterentwicklung der Inneren Fuehrung" in *Zur Aktualitaet des Denkens von Wolf Graf von Baudissin*, ed. Michael Staack (WIFIS-aktuell, Wissenschaftliches Forum fuer internationale Sicherheit e.V. (Leverkusen Opladen: Budrich, November 2011), 44; Gerhard Kuemmel, "Civil-Military Relations in Germany: Past, Present and Future," *SOWI-Arbeitspapier*, no. 131 (Strausberg: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr (Bundeswehr Institute for Social Science) November 2001), 17.

<sup>79</sup> Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 63; Detlef Bald, Hans-Guenther Froehling, Juergen Gross, Claus Freiherr von Rosen, *Zurueckgestutzt, sinnentleert, unverstanden: Die Innere Fuehrung der Bundeswehr* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), 11; Detlef Bald, "Politik gegen die Demokratisierung der Bundeswehr," in *Zurueckgestutzt, sinnentleert, unverstanden: Die Innere Fuehrung der Bundeswehr*, ed. Detlef Bald, Hans-Guenther Froehling, Juergen Gross, Claus Freiherr von Rosen (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), 51; Detlef Bald, "Die Reform der

Bundeswehr und eine zeitgemaesse Innere Fuehrung. Fuenfzehn Thesen und Anregungen,” in *Zurueckgestutzt, sinnentleert, unverstanden*, 113.

<sup>80</sup> Juergen Rose, “Demokratisierung der Bundeswehr als Schritt auf dem Weg zum Frieden: Anmerkungen zu den Zivilisierungsperspektiven einer autoritaeren Institution,” *CCS Working Papers*, no. 14 (Marburg: Philipps Universitaet, Center for Conflict Studies (CCS), 2011), 10, <http://www.uni-marburg.de/konfliktforschung/publikationen/wp14.pdf> (accessed December 6, 2011).

<sup>81</sup> Abenheim, *Soldiers and Politics Transformed*, 211.

<sup>82</sup> Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 123.

<sup>83</sup> Frank Naegler, “Innere Fuehrung: Zum Entstehungszusammenhang einer Fuehrungsphilosophie fuer die Bundeswehr” in Deutschland und Oesterreich nach 1945,” in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 328: In a 1951 survey, 40% of Germans approved of the attempt by the resistance to assassinate Hitler, while 30% opposed the effort. Then, in 1956, only 18% approved naming a school for a resistance fighter, and 49% would not accept this recognition to an opponent of Hitler.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 327.

<sup>85</sup> BA-MA, “Die Offizierlage der Bundeswehr” (BWD 13/106, P III 1 – Az.: 16-10-01 TgbNr. 7797/64 VS-NfD, November 11, 1964), 88, quoted in Naegler, “Innere Fuehrung” in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 331: Enlistments of former Wehrmacht officers: 1955/56: 8,140, 1957: 1,560, 1958: 1,166, 1959: 1,104, 1960: 822, 1961: 479, 1962: 141 and 1963: 26. From 1958 onwards, former *Wehrmacht* officers also occupied positions of junior officers in the *Bundeswehr*; Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 77: Recruitment of *Bundeswehr* soldiers suffered from the competition of the post-war German economic miracle.

<sup>86</sup> Naegler, “Innere Fuehrung,” in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*,” 331; Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 118: “The future officers and NCOs would face the task—for which they were essentially unprepared—of training the new soldiers in peacetime. “The young officer corps of first and second lieutenants is wholly missing: the young NCO corps is totally missing.” Furthermore, the field grade officers had little peacetime experience, since most of them had attained their rank in war.”

<sup>87</sup> The [German] Federal Minister of Defense, *Innere Fuehrung*, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1 (2008), no. 308, annex 2/2: Section 11 of *Soldatengesetz* (SG) (Legal Status of Military Personnel Act) (Section 1(3) SG, Sections 1 to 6 VorgV [Ministerial Directive Governing Superior-Subordinate Relations]): “Ignoring an order that violates human dignity, that was not given for service-related purposes (Section 11(1) SG), or the observance of which would be unacceptable is not disobedience.”

<sup>88</sup> John K. Bleicher und Knut Hickethier, “Der Blick des Fernsehens auf die Bundeswehr” in *Die Bundeswehr 1955 bis 2005. Rueckblenden – Einsichten – Perspektiven*, ed. Frank Naegler (Muenchen: R. Oldenbourg, 2007), 270; Nina Werkhaeuser, “German Army Celebrates 50-Year Milestone,” November 12, 2005, <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1770642,00.html> (accessed November 24, 2011); Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 173.

<sup>89</sup> Detlef Bald, *Die Bundeswehr: Eine kritische Geschichte 1955-2005* (Muenchen: Verlag C.H. Beck oHG, 2005), 66-67; Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 202-203; Frank Naegler, *Der gewollte Soldat und sein Wandel: Personelle Ruestung und Innere Fuehrung in den Aufbaujahren der Bundeswehr 1956 bis 1964/65* (Muenchen: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2010), 467-468.

<sup>90</sup> Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 203.

<sup>91</sup> Deutscher Bundestag, 5. Wahlperiode, Drucksache V/3912, Bonn 1969, quoted in Rudolf Schlaffer, "Der Wehrbeauftragte – Kontrolleur der inneren Entwicklung der Bundeswehr," in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 397.

<sup>92</sup> Schlaffer, Schmidt, *Wolf Graf von Baudissin 1907-1993*, 237: That was after the retirement of Baudissin who retired December 31, 1967.

<sup>93</sup> Detlef Bald, "Die Militaerreform in der "Aera Brandt" – zur Integration von Militaer und Gesellschaft," in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 341-342; Donald Abenheim, "Image of the Wehrmacht in Federal German Society and in the Tradition of the Bundeswehr" (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Civil-Military Relations, August 1999), 24.

<sup>94</sup> Naegler, "Innere Fuehrung," in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 332-333.

<sup>95</sup> Angelika Doerfler-Dierken, "Die Bedeutung des Jahres 1968 fuer die Innere Fuehrung," in *Zurueckgestutzt, sinnentleert, unverstanden*, 71-72; *Ibid.*, 68-69: In addition, Gustav Heinemann, Federal President of Germany, pronounced that German soldiers' first obligation was to serve peace and avoid war.

<sup>96</sup> Bald, "Die Militaerreform in der "Aera Brandt"," in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 343-344.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, 349.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 344-346: As a result, the demographics of the officers changed in 1975 as follows: public servants from 42% (1967) to 26% (1975), white-collar employees from 26% to 41%, blue-collar workers from 4% to 17%, self-employed, farmers and craftsman from 26% to 15%. Most important the percentage of aristocratic lieutenants fell from 15% to only 1%.

<sup>99</sup> Doerfler-Dierken, "Die Bedeutung des Jahres 1968," in *Zurueckgestutzt, sinnentleert, unverstanden*, 74: The results of that conference were considered later in the Advisory Council on Questions of *Innere Fuehrung*.

<sup>100</sup> *Der Spiegel Home Page*, "Einklassige Dorfschule," <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-42971860.html> (accessed December 6, 2011).

<sup>101</sup> Meyer, "Innere Fuehrung und Auslandseinsaetze," 8; Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 252-253.

<sup>102</sup> Hans Apel, "Soldaten in der Demokratie," *Der Spiegel Online*, September 22, 1980, 58-59, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-14331621.html> (accessed December 7, 2011).

<sup>103</sup> Abenheim, *Soldiers and Politics Transformed*, 28: "In its head and limbs in 1990, the NVA remained a Germanized version of the Soviet Army."

<sup>104</sup> Werner von Scheven, "Die Bundeswehr und der Aufbau Ost," in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 442: "and all female officer candidates, except those in medical service." Own translation from: "sowie die weiblichen Offizieranwaerter, die nicht der Sanitaetstruppe angehörten," Andre Bickford, "Soldiers, Citizens, and the State: East German Army Officers in Post-Unification Germany," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, no. 51(2), (2009): 260–261, in ProQuest (accessed January 6, 2012).

<sup>105</sup> Gunnar Digutsch, "Die NVA und die Armee der Einheit" in *Die Bundeswehr 1955–2005, Rueckblenden – Einsichten – Perspektiven*, ed. Frank Naegler (Muenchen: R. Oldenbourg, 2007), 451.

<sup>106</sup> Scheven, "Die Bundeswehr und der Aufbau Ost," 443.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., 442; Digutsch, "Die NVA und die Armee der Einheit," 467: corps and division level units were taken over by generals and their teams from the *Bundeswehr*. On the regiment and battalion level, *Bundeswehr* officers took the lead. In cases whrer NPA officers were in the lead, a training and support group from the *Bundeswehr* was attached.

<sup>108</sup> Joseph Fitchett, "German Army Smoothly Makes Room in the Ranks for Former Foes; Success Story for the Bundeswehr / 10% of Its 30,000 Officers Come From the East," *The New York Times Online*, February 11, 2000, <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/11/news/11iht-bundes.2.t.html?...all> (accessed December 17, 2011).

<sup>109</sup> Abenheim, *Soldiers and Politics Transformed*, 20; Digutsch, "Die NVA und die Armee der Einheit," 470.

<sup>110</sup> Abenheim, *German Soldier and German Unity*, 16-17.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., 18: "fully 98% of the officer corps joined the *SED* [Socialist Unity Party];" Digutsch has slightly different and more detailed figures, see Digutsch, "Die NVA und die Armee der Einheit," 451-453: Members of the *SED*, end of 1988: officers: 96%, officer cadets: 94% and NCOs: 60%.

<sup>112</sup> Bickford, "Soldiers, Citizens, and the State," 263-264, 279, 283.

<sup>113</sup> Nina Leonhard, "Die Soldaten der NVA und die "Armee der Einheit"," in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 457; Abenheim, *German Soldier and German Unity*, 17-19.

<sup>114</sup> Abenheim, *Soldiers and Politics Transformed*, 25-26.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 26; Ruediger Wenske, "Zur Sicht der NVA auf die "Innere Fuehrung" in der Bundeswehr" in *Wolf Graf von Baudissin 1907-1993: Modernisierer zwischen totalitaerer Herrschaft und freiheitlicher Ordnung*, ed. Rudolf J. Schlaffer, Wolfgang Schmidt (Muenchen: R. Oldenbourg, 2007), 195; for background on the different views on Innere Fuehrung, see Abenheim, *German Soldier and German Unity*, 22-25.

<sup>116</sup> Christian Millotat, "Gedanken zum Berufsbild des Offiziers der Bundeswehr von heute— 50 Jahre Bundeswehr ohne aktuelles Berufsbild ihrer Offiziere," September 2005, 6, [http://www.deutschlandjournal.de/Deutschland\\_Journal\\_Ausgabe\\_20/Christian\\_Millotat\\_Gedanken\\_zum\\_Berufsbild\\_des\\_Offiziers\\_d\\_.pdf](http://www.deutschlandjournal.de/Deutschland_Journal_Ausgabe_20/Christian_Millotat_Gedanken_zum_Berufsbild_des_Offiziers_d_.pdf) (accessed November 26, 2011): Millotat gave an example of soldiers of the former 11th Motorized Schuetzen-Division of the former NPA. Among its 326 officers and 565 NCOs, none belonged to a Christian church; Hilmar Schmundt, "Going Godless: Does Secularism Make People More Ethical?", trans. Alison Kilian, *Spiegel Online International Homepage*, November 8, 2011, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,777281,00.html> (accessed November 26, 2011); for background on the development since 1949, see Esther Peperkamp, Małgorzata Rajtar, *Religion and the Secular in Eastern German: 1945 to the present* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2010), 5-11.

<sup>117</sup> John O. Koehler, "Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police," *New York Times Online*, 1999: "The Stasi, the East German secret police,...considered themselves the "shield and sword" of the party. When the regime collapsed, the Stasi had 102,000 full-time officers and noncommissioned personnel on its rolls, including 11,000 members of the ministry's own special guards regiment. Between 1950 and 1989, a total of 274,000 persons served in the Stasi." In addition, there were "regular Stasi informers," the *inoffizielle Mitarbeiter* (IMs). By 1995, 174,000 had been identified as IMs, or 2.5 percent of the total population between the ages of 18 and 60. Researchers were aghast when they found that about 10,000 IMs, or roughly 6 percent of the total, had not yet reached the age of 18. Since many records were destroyed, the exact number of IMs probably will never be determined; but 500,000 was cited as a realistic figure. Former Colonel Rainer Wiegand, who served in the Stasi counterintelligence directorate, estimated that the figure could go as high as 2 million, if occasional stool pigeons were included." <http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/k/koehler-stasi.html> (accessed December 7, 2011); for background on how the Stasi infiltrated the National Peoples Army, see Charles A. Steele, *Brothers in Arms: Case Studies of Officer and NCO Integration in the New States of the Federal Republic of Germany*, Dissertation (Morgantown, WV: West Virginia University, 2000), 71-72, 144-145, in ProQuest (accessed December 7, 2011).

<sup>118</sup> Digutsch, "Die NVA und die Armee der Einheit," 471-472: The independent committee which assessed the former NPA soldiers was founded in March 1992. The committee was under the lead of the former state secretary Agnes Huerland-Buening. The mission was to screen NPA applicants for active service in the Bundeswehr, in order to assure that accepted applicants were not ideologues; Scheven, "Die Bundeswehr und der Aufbau Ost," 453; Roy R. Weidanz, *Casualties of Unification? Understanding the various Interpretations of the Dissolution of the Nationale Volksarmee and the Integration of its members into the Bundeswehr*, Thesis (Tallahassee, FL: The Florida State University, Spring Semester, 2005), 79-82.

<sup>119</sup> Leonhard, "Die Soldaten der NVA und die "Armee der Einheit"," 461.

<sup>120</sup> *Bundeswehr Home Page*, "Hintergrundinformationen zur Eingliederung von Soldaten der NVA in die Bundeswehr (Background information on integration of Soldiers of the National Peoples Army into the Bundeswehr)," [http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/NYzBDolwEES\\_hR\\_o0gNlvGGMxoueJOKttGtpKC1ZFrn48bYHZ5K5vMmDF6QG9XFWsYtBeXhCp92-30S\\_GRQLEzoeSeGbUVhag\\_HKYhAWFz04PTDCIzvSV8eAnJcxsEtrSXEkMUdin8IKllhwBrpSHg9yV\\_4jv\\_X53tZNVcnL9XTLQm-hMwjzNDVbWxQ\\_swOnBw!!/](http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/NYzBDolwEES_hR_o0gNlvGGMxoueJOKttGtpKC1ZFrn48bYHZ5K5vMmDF6QG9XFWsYtBeXhCp92-30S_GRQLEzoeSeGbUVhag_HKYhAWFz04PTDCIzvSV8eAnJcxsEtrSXEkMUdin8IKllhwBrpSHg9yV_4jv_X53tZNVcnL9XTLQm-hMwjzNDVbWxQ_swOnBw!!/) (accessed December 7, 2011).



<sup>121</sup> Abenheim, *Soldiers and Politics Transformed*, 34.

<sup>122</sup> Leonhard, "Die Soldaten der NVA und die "Armee der Einheit", 462-463.

<sup>123</sup> Meyer, *The Concept of "Innere Fuehrung"*, 10-11.

<sup>124</sup> Scheven, "Die Bundeswehr und der Aufbau Ost," 449.

<sup>125</sup> Christian Hacke, "Die Sicherheitspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 275; Steele named it "army of unity," see Steele, *Brothers in Arms*, 8.

<sup>126</sup> Karl Johanny, "Ein Teil der Bundeswehr wie die Streitkraefte: 50 Jahre Bundeswehrverwaltung," in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 207; Meyer, "Innere Fuehrung und Auslandseinsaetze": 10.

<sup>127</sup> Markus Reinhardt, *Civil-Military Relations*, 5-6: Even if it "encountered opposition from especially France."

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., 44.

<sup>129</sup> Dr. Karl Gleumes, "Der Wehrbeauftragte, Hilfsorgan des Bundestages bei der Ausuebung der parlamentarischen Kontrolle," Deutscher Bundestag, Referat Oeffentlichkeitsarbeit, September 2008, 14, <https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/20209000.pdf> (accessed February 26, 2012).

<sup>130</sup> "Bericht fuer die Sitzung des Verteidigungsausschusses am 17. Juni 2009 zum Thema "Innere Fuehrung" (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung—1680007-V615—Thomas Kossendey, Parlamentarischer Staatssekretaer, Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages, June 2, 2009), 1.

<sup>131</sup> Deutscher Bundestag, "Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany," 73: "Article 87a [Armed Forces];" Peter Dreist, "Die Auslandseinsaetze der Bundeswehr zwischen Politik und Verfassungsrecht," in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 508: The interpretation of defense was limited to defend Germany within its borders or within an alliance; Karen Carstens, "The Week in Germany," *German Missions in the United States Homepage*, February 17, 2012, [http://www.germany.info/Vertretung/usa/en/newsletter/The\\_Week\\_in\\_Germany/TWIG\\_120\\_217.html](http://www.germany.info/Vertretung/usa/en/newsletter/The_Week_in_Germany/TWIG_120_217.html) (accessed March 2, 2012).

<sup>132</sup> Dreist, "Die Auslandseinsaetze der Bundeswehr zwischen Politik und Verfassungsrecht," 509.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., 509.

<sup>134</sup> Kerry Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force: The evolution of German security policy 1990-2003* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2004), 59-60; *Die Bundesregierung Home Page*, "Chronologie der Einsaetze (Chronolgy of Bundeswehr missions)," August 28, 2008, <http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/Auslandseinsaetze/ChronologieEinsaetze/2008-04-24-Chronologie%20der%20Eins%C3%A4tze.html> (accessed March 3, 2012).

<sup>135</sup> Dreist, "Die Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr zwischen Politik und Verfassungsrecht," 509, 511-517; "The Legacy of Federal Constitutional Court President Jutta Limbach," *German Law Journal* (2002): 3, <http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=161> (accessed December 16, 2011); Ulrike Liebert, "Europeanizing the Military: The ECJ and the Transformation of the Bundeswehr," CEuS Working Paper 2002/7 (2002), 3-4: In addition, on 11 January 2000, the European Court of Justice declared that women should be admitted to all military services. The Bundeswehr was at that time not properly prepared for such a step. <http://www.monnet-centre.uni-bremen.de/pdf/wp/2002-7-Liebert.pdf> (accessed December 16, 2011).

<sup>136</sup> Gerhard Kuemmel, Paul Klein, Klaus Lohmann, *Zwischen Differenz und Gleichheit: die Öffnung der Bundeswehr für Frauen* (Strausberg: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, 2000), 9, quoted in Ulrike Liebert's "Europeanizing the Military: The ECJ and the Transformation of the Bundeswehr," CEuS Working Paper 2002/7 (2002), 4.

<sup>137</sup> Stefanie Fletcher, "On a new mission: The foreign missions of the Bundeswehr and German security policy," *Compass 2020: Germany in International relations. Aims, instruments, prospects*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, May 2007, 10, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/05162.pdf> (accessed February 27, 2012).

<sup>138</sup> Dr. Peter Struck, *Defense Policy Guidelines* (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung ([German] Federal Ministry of Defense), May 21, 2003), 11-12, [http://merlin.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Germany\\_English2003.pdf](http://merlin.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Germany_English2003.pdf) (accessed November 27, 2011).

<sup>139</sup> [German] Federal Ministry of Defense, *White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr* (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defense, 2006), 9, [http://merlin.ndu.edu/whitepapers/germany\\_white\\_paper\\_2006.pdf](http://merlin.ndu.edu/whitepapers/germany_white_paper_2006.pdf) (accessed November 27, 2011).

<sup>140</sup> Tom Dyson, "Managing Convergence: German Military Doctrine and Capabilities in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," *Defense Studies*, Vol. 11, No 2 (June 2011): 253-254.

<sup>141</sup> Niels Klabunde, "Cultural Diplomacy as "Soft Power" and the Need for Cultural Knowledge in Germany's Mission in Afghanistan," 7, <http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/pdf/case-studies/cd-as-a-softpower.pdf> (accessed February 27, 2012); Bald, *Die Bundeswehr: Eine kritische Geschichte 1955-2005*, 144-145; "Bundeswehr: Neue Ära," *Der Spiegel Online*, December 28, 1992, 30-31: The 1992 created slogan "helping, protecting and securing" of the former Minister of Defense, Volker Ruehe, was still deeply ingrained in German society, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13855395.html> (accessed December 9, 2011)

<sup>142</sup> Dyson, "Managing Convergence," 252: "The cult of the warrior was weak or absent within the *Bundeswehr*," *Spiegel online International Homepage*, "Army's Composition 'Still Reflects Spirit of Cold War'," June 14, 2010, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,700511,00.html> (accessed February 27, 2012); James D. Bindenagel, "Afghanistan: The German Factor," *Prism* 1, no. 4 (September 2010), 96: "German politicians have been slowly urging the German public to be more involved militarily and to accept a military-combat role in NATO operations;" Ibid., 106: "The Kunduz attack has changed the debate; Germans in Afghanistan are at war and war is [still] rejected by a significant majority of Germans at home."

<sup>143</sup> Meyer, "Innere Fuehrung und Auslandseinsaetze:" 11.

<sup>144</sup> During my general staff course in 1993, we visited the Center, which then offered a course entitled: "Injury and Death."

<sup>145</sup> Meyer, "Innere Fuehrung und Auslandseinsaetze:" 16-23.

<sup>146</sup> Dr. Peter Struck, *Defense Policy Guidelines* (2003), 19.

<sup>147</sup> [German] Federal Ministry of Defense, *White Paper 2006*, 10.

<sup>148</sup> Meyer, "Innere Fuehrung und Auslandseinsaetze:" 23-24.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., 24: Both the traditionalists and the reformers of the founding generation retired from the *Bundeswehr* in the mid-1980s.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid.

<sup>151</sup> DW-Staff (jen), "18 Soldiers Indicted in Hazing Case," *Deutsche Welle Homepage*, June 21, 2005: Coesfeld incident 2004: "Eighteen German soldiers were indicted Monday in the wake of a scandal surrounding the alleged abuse of more than 160 military recruits, using electrical shocks and beatings," <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1623143,00.html> (accessed November 1, 2011); *Spiegel Online International Homepage*, "Afghanistan Scandal: Skull Images Shock Germany," October 26, 2006: Afghanistan incident 2006: "German soldiers desecrating a skull in Afghanistan have triggered a full blown image crisis for Germany. Those who behave like that have no place in the *Bundeswehr*," intoned German Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung on Wednesday. Chancellor Angela Merkel weighed in Wednesday, calling the photos "shocking and repugnant," <http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,444879,00.html> (accessed November 1, 2011).

<sup>152</sup> The [German] Federal Minister of Defense, *Innere Fuehrung*, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1 (2008): Mission and mission related issues are mentioned in the regulation on several places: Mission: no. 105, 501, 504, 609, 620, 628, 636, 663, 672, 675, Mission readiness: no. 612, 624, 654, 675, Mission ability: no 644.

<sup>153</sup> [German] Federal Ministry of Defense Home Page, "Compulsory and voluntary military service," July 1, 2011, [http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/FcxLDoAgDADRG7V7d55CccengUYohCJcX80kbzl44ZfYydEOrmlznmg8b26BKzOCsk UE HQVjMPvsE9EkgXpQ4\\_gUI04PGPckRDgg2U\\_QXOHYjX/](http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/FcxLDoAgDADRG7V7d55CccengUYohCJcX80kbzl44ZfYydEOrmlznmg8b26BKzOCsk UE HQVjMPvsE9EkgXpQ4_gUI04PGPckRDgg2U_QXOHYjX/) (accessed December 10, 2011); Donnelly, B.A., *Public Opinion of Conscription*, 2: Conscription was established in Prussia in 1813. "...The Versailles Treaty restricted the German Army to 100,000 professional soldiers, effectively ending conscription in Germany for the time being...Adolf Hitler...quickly began remilitarizing Germany and in 1935 reintroduced conscription." Therefore, for more than 170 years, the conscript system has been a vital part of German history.

<sup>154</sup> Klaus-Juergen Bremm, Hans-Hubertus Mack, Martin Rink, *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 1; Hartmann, *Innere Fuehrung: Erfolge und Defizite der Fuehrungsphilosophie der Bundeswehr*, 35; [German] Federal Ministry of Defense Home Page, "Compulsory and voluntary military service," July 1, 2011.



<sup>155</sup> For possible consequences of an all-volunteer force which deploys their soldiers on combat tours regularly, see Mark Thompson, "An Army Apart: 45,000 troops are coming home to a country that doesn't know them," *Time*, November 21, 2011, 35: "The past decade of war by volunteer soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines has acted like a centrifuge, separating the nation's military from its citizens. Most Americans have not served in uniform, no longer have a parent who did and are unlikely to encourage their children to enlist." The U.S. example cannot be translated into German society 100%, but some of the consequences may become reality for the all-volunteer *Bundeswehr* in the future.

<sup>156</sup> *Prof. Dr. M. Wolffsohn Home Page*: Professor Dr. Michael Wolffsohn (17 May 1947–) is an Israeli-born German historian who is working at the Bundeswehr University Munich as a historian, <http://www.wolffsohn.de/> (accessed January 6, 2012).

<sup>157</sup> Michael Wolffsohn, "Die Unterschicht übernimmt die Landesverteidigung," *Welt Online*, January 16, 2011 <http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article12186329/Die-Unterschicht-uebernimmt-die-Landesverteidigung.html> (accessed January 6, 2012); Nils Handler, "Nach dem Ende der Wehrpflicht: Bangen vor dem Ossi-Ansturm," *Stern Online*, September 2, 2011, <http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/nach-dem-ende-der-wehrpflicht-bangen-vor-dem-ossi-ansturm-1723284.html#main> (accessed December 16, 2011).

<sup>158</sup> Wenke Apt, "Demographischer Wandel als Rekrutierungsproblem? Regionale Ungleichheit und unerschlossene Potentiale bei der Nachwuchsgewinnung der Bundeswehr," *SWP-Aktuell* 41 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs), May 2010), 2, [http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2010A41\\_apw\\_ks.pdf](http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2010A41_apw_ks.pdf) (accessed December 16, 2011); for German population by area, see *Statistisches Bundesamt Homepage*, "Population by area," July 15, 2011, <http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/EN/Content/Statistics/TimeSeries/LongTermSeries/Population/Content75/lrbev03a,templateId=renderPrint.psml> (accessed December 16, 2011).

<sup>159</sup> Hartmann, *Innere Fuehrung: Erfolge und Defizite der Fuehrungsphilosophie der Bundeswehr*, 35: A widespread consensus in German society is that conscription has facilitated the integration of the *Bundeswehr* into society.

<sup>160</sup> German Ministry of Defense – The Minister –, *Defense Policy Guidelines: Safeguarding National Interests – Assuming International Responsibility – Shaping Security Together* (Berlin: May 27, 2011), 16-17, [http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/LYsxEOAgDATf4gdIb-cv1MYBzcQbMDgQ8ftSONtssUsrddQ3iDdk9YImWnaM4XXhaulq9pPLYbB65wRDdF6FQzZ2R47PxdqtcTHGAXIU\\_q72byv9tgQFK91xGj6tRqx1/](http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/LYsxEOAgDATf4gdIb-cv1MYBzcQbMDgQ8ftSONtssUsrddQ3iDdk9YImWnaM4XXhaulq9pPLYbB65wRDdF6FQzZ2R47PxdqtcTHGAXIU_q72byv9tgQFK91xGj6tRqx1/) (accessed November 27, 2011).

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, 9-10, 13-14.

<sup>162</sup> Hartmann, "Baudissin und die Weiterentwicklung der Inneren Fuehrung," 43.

<sup>163</sup> Dr. Horst Koehler, "Rede von Bundespräsident Horst Köhler beim Festakt zum 50-jährigen Bestehen der Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr am 14. September 2007 in Hamburg: "Maßstäbe der Führungsauslese", "FueAk-Reflexionen, *Zeitschrift der Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr* (Newspaper of Command and Staff College of the Bundeswehr), no. 8 (September 2007), 7: "polite disinterest," own translation from

“freundliche[s] Desinteresse,”

[http://www.fueakbw.de/share/I/05\\_Publikationen/07\\_FueAk\\_Reflexionen/Jahrgang\\_2007/FueAk\\_Reflexionen\\_Nr8\\_09\\_2007.pdf](http://www.fueakbw.de/share/I/05_Publikationen/07_FueAk_Reflexionen/Jahrgang_2007/FueAk_Reflexionen_Nr8_09_2007.pdf) (accessed March 1, 2012)

<sup>164</sup> Homepage of Professor Dr. Elmar Wiesendahl: W. is head of the department of social science at the Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, <http://www.elmarwiesendahl.de/> (accessed January 9, 2012).

<sup>165</sup> Elmar Wiesendahl, “Zur Aktualitaet der Inneren Fuehrung von Baudissin fuer das 21. Jahrhundert: Ein analytischer Bezugsrahmen” in *Innere Fuehrung fuer das 21. Jahrhundert: Die Bundeswehr und das Erbe Baudissins*, ed. Elmar Wiesendahl (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoeningh, 2007), 161-162.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid., 13-16: Wiesendahl describes four different positions on how *Innere Fuehrung* should be adapted: (1) the preservers see no need for any action, because any change would destroy the original ideas of *Innere Fuehrung*. (2) The probationers are convinced that *Innere Fuehrung* has shown its adaptability also in deployments and see now further need for adaption (3) The total revisionists proclaim the end of *Innere Fuehrung* with the transformation of the *Bundeswehr* to an expeditionary force. Therefore, the *Bundeswehr* has to concentrate on the rebirth of the warrior and the “citizen in uniform” is not acceptable anymore. (4) The technocratic revisionists have a problem with *Innere Fuehrung* in deployments. For them the legitimacy for the soldiers derived from the duties within tasking of international organizations (UN, NATO, and WEU); Hartmann, *Innere Fuehrung: Erfolge und Defizite der Fuehrungsphilosophie der Bundeswehr*, 264-266: Hartmann made five proposals for politicians, four for society, and 16 for the *Bundeswehr*; Berthold Meyer, “Innere Fuehrung ist keine Schoenwetter-Dienstvorschrift” in *Bundeswehr im Krieg: wie kann die Innere Fuehrung ueberleben?*, ed. Detlef Bald, Hans-Guenter Froehling, Juergen Gross, *Hamburger Beitraege zur Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik*, Heft 153 (Hamburg: Dezember 2009), 42-44: Meyer proposed ten considerations to keep *Innere Fuehrung* as the army’s corporate identity and to enhance its practical use for the newly elected German parliament in 2009; Doerfler-Dierken, “Die Bedeutung des Jahres 1968,” in *Zurueckgestutzt, sinnentleert, unverstanden*, 96-105: Doerfler-Dierken offered 14 recommendations on how the *Bundeswehr* should adapt to the new challenges; Bald, “Die Reform der Bundeswehr und eine zeitgemaesse Innere Fuehrung,” in *Zurueckgestutzt, sinnentleert, unverstanden*, 96-105: On the other hand, Bald specified 15 theses and made six suggestions for structural reforms within the *Bundeswehr* and three proposals for political action; Juergen Rose, “Vision “Zivilisierung des Militaers”,” in *Zurueckgestutzt, sinnentleert, unverstanden*, 143-151, 153: Rose, after explaining the weaknesses of *Innere Fuehrung* from his point of view, advanced five concrete proposals to change the Legal Status of Military Personnel Act and the Ministerial Directive Governing Superior-Subordinate Relations.

<sup>167</sup> Meyer, “Innere Fuehrung und Auslandseinsaetze:” 25-27: Meyer describes how the subcommittee of the Defense Committee did not properly cooperate with the *Bundeswehr* and the consequences of this lack of cooperation.

<sup>168</sup> *Deutscher BundeswehrVerband Homepage*, The Bundeswehr Association Home Page, [https://www.dbwv.de/C12574E8003E04C8/Docname/INTERN\\_HomeDE](https://www.dbwv.de/C12574E8003E04C8/Docname/INTERN_HomeDE) (accessed December 16, 2011; Sabine Manitz, “Redefining Soldierly Role Models in Germany,” 685: This organization is a kind of a union.

<sup>169</sup> [German] Federal Ministry of Defense Home Page, "Accompanying Programme for the Reform," October 18, 2011, [http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/RYyxDolwFEW\\_xR\\_og2glcZOWOOjAoriQQI\\_Ki-WVtK-w-PHCYLw3OctJDrxgO-uFrBbyrB08oR3o3K-qnxarlq0jhhFJ4uwdCb1Vn9hgXHEMijFZjKKdJLadwdD9JTz2tEE1eEbZKchCG23Q4oOafRC3mxTCZhQZaLO8rrl8-y3\\_ILemOt6L4IRfq2YPOgstMszTVK6Xw-ELtgQxCA!!/](http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/RYyxDolwFEW_xR_og2glcZOWOOjAoriQQI_Ki-WVtK-w-PHCYLw3OctJDrxgO-uFrBbyrB08oR3o3K-qnxarlq0jhhFJ4uwdCb1Vn9hgXHEMijFZjKKdJLadwdD9JTz2tEE1eEbZKchCG23Q4oOafRC3mxTCZhQZaLO8rrl8-y3_ILemOt6L4IRfq2YPOgstMszTVK6Xw-ELtgQxCA!!/) (accessed February 27, 2012)

<sup>170</sup> Meyer, *The Concept of "Innere Fuehrung,"* 6-7: "it is principally possible for civil students to study at a Bundeswehr-university, this has never happened in reality;" *Zivile Karriere Bundeswehr Homepage*: instead the Bundeswehr civilians study at public universities, [https://ziv.bundeswehr-karriere.de/portal/a/zivkarriere/!ut/p/c4/PYqxDYQwDABnYQG7\\_-63ADonOMTCn7wcHCSmhwKha06nwxlvCnVZaZdaSHHEKconHHBK38hM2Bhe6dWC6OJlhUQx5xpzi9nVWBJDuBNrtbb7lv4D8vbcjYKSJ\\_xv3-ECWwv73A!!/](https://ziv.bundeswehr-karriere.de/portal/a/zivkarriere/!ut/p/c4/PYqxDYQwDABnYQG7_-63ADonOMTCn7wcHCSmhwKha06nwxlvCnVZaZdaSHHEKconHHBK38hM2Bhe6dWC6OJlhUQx5xpzi9nVWBJDuBNrtbb7lv4D8vbcjYKSJ_xv3-ECWwv73A!!/) (accessed February 27, 2012); The [German] Federal Minister of Defense, *Innere Fuehrung*, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1 (2008), No. 502, 16: "The civilian employees of the *Bundeswehr* must be aware of the fact that their actions frequently affect the rights and duties of soldiers. They play an important role in shaping the internal state of the armed forces and thus must also act in accordance with the principles of *Innere Fuehrung*."

<sup>171</sup> Juergen Gross, "Einfuehrung," in *Zurueckgestutzt, sinnentleert, unverstanden*, 13-16: Gross describes how *Innere Fuehrung* lost its significance in the *Bundeswehr* over the time.

<sup>172</sup> *Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr Homepage*, The Bundeswehr Institute for Social Sciences Home Page, [http://www.sowi.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/swinstbw/!ut/p/c4/04\\_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK94uyk-OLyzLzikaRy\\_XCQupx0\\_cjUPP2C3FxHAEsEJ7I!!/](http://www.sowi.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/swinstbw/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK94uyk-OLyzLzikaRy_XCQupx0_cjUPP2C3FxHAEsEJ7I!!/) (accessed November 27, 2011).

<sup>173</sup> Meyer, "Innere Fuehrung und Auslandseinsatze:" 33.

